Women -- Suffrage -- History; Women -- Suffrage -- United States -- History; Women's rights -- History; Women's rights -- United States -- History
Mr. ANTHONY: I suppose the Senator from Pennsylvania introduced
this amendment rather as a satire upon the bill itself, or if he
had any serious intention it was only a mischievous one to injure
the bill; but it will not probably have that effect, for I
suppose nobody will vote for it except the Senator himself, who
can hardly avoid it, and I, who shall vote for it because it
accords with a conclusion to which I have been brought by
considerable study upon the subject of suffrage. I do not contend
for female suffrage on the ground that it is a natural right,
because I believe that suffrage is a right derived from society,
and that society is competent to impose upon the exercise of that
right whatever conditions it chooses. I hold that the suffrage is
a delegated trust--a trust delegated to certain designated
classes of society--and that the whole body-politic has the same
right to withdraw any part of that trust, that we have to
withdraw any part of the powers or the trusts that we have
imposed upon any executive officer, and that it is no more a
punishment to restrict the suffrage, and thereby deprive certain
persons of the exercise of that right who have heretofore
exercised it, than it is a punishment on the Secretary of the
Treasury if we should take from him the appointment of certain
persons whose appointment is now vested in him. The power that
confers in each case has the right to withdraw.
The true basis of suffrage, of course, is intelligence and
virtue; but as we can not define those, as we can not draw the
line that shall mark the amount of intelligence and virtue that
any individual possesses, we come as near as we can to it by
imperfect conditions. It certainly will not be contended that the
feminine part of mankind are so much below the masculine in point
of intelligence as to disqualify them from exercising the right
of suffrage on that account. If it be asserted and conceded that
the feminine intellect is less vigorous, it must also be allowed
that it is more acute; if it is not so strong to strike, it is
quicker to perceive. But at all events, it will not be contended
that there is such a difference in the intellectual capacity of
the sexes as that that alone should be a disqualification from
the exercise of the right of suffrage. Still less will it be
contended that the female part of creation is less virtuous than
the masculine. On the contrary, it will be conceded by every one
that morality and good order, religion, charity, and all good
works appertain rather more to the feminine than to the masculine
race.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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