As soon as war broke out, it was clear that the sympathies of the Italian people were wholly on the side of England, France, and Russia, and that it was the wish of the people, if it became necessary to draw the sword, to wield it in such a way as to recover Italia Irredenta, which happened to be under Austrian rule. It should be remarked that Italy's obligations under her treaty of alliance with Germany and Austria did not compel her to take part in any war unless the war were a purely defensive one; and the Government at Rome made it clear from the first that it regarded the action of Austria towards Servia, and the action of Germany towards France and Belgium, as aggressive. In spite of reiterated assurances of neutrality, it was persistently rumoured, particularly in Paris, that Italy would declare war on Austria at almost any moment. Although no general mobilisation order was issued at Rome, it was understood that several classes of reservists had been called up. It was indeed felt that any action which Italy might take ought to be taken soon. Well-known military and naval experts, such as Admiral Mahan, expressed the view that Italy "would do well to make her strength felt early." On August 29th an incident was reported which seemed to show that the decisive step might come at any time. On the previous day information was received at Malta to the effect that Herr von Bitzow, who had been acting as German Consul at Tripoli, had been carrying on an anti-Italian propaganda among the natives; and it was even alleged that he had issued a secret manifesto urging them to make demonstrations. The Italian Government, with more than its usual promptitude, had the offending Consul arrested and removed to Italy, at the same time lodging a protest with the German Foreign Office. No more was heard of this incident at the time; but, as may easily be imagined if it had occurred at any other juncture it would have brought about an acute crisis within the radius of the Triple Alliance.