Human, All-Too-Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Part 1: Complete Works, Volume SixNietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm
PhilosophyPhilosophy
Human, All-Too-Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Part 1: Complete Works, Volume Six
Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm
Human beings
ERROR ABOUT LIFE NECESSARY FOR LIFE.--Every belief in the value and
worthiness of life is based on vitiated thought; it is only possible
through the fact that sympathy for the general life and suffering of
mankind is very weakly developed in the individual. Even the rarer
people who think outside themselves do not contemplate this general
life, but only a limited part of it. If one understands how to direct
one's attention chiefly to the exceptions,--I mean to the highly gifted
and the rich souls,--if one regards the production of these as the aim
of the whole world-development and rejoices in its operation, then
one may believe in the value of life, because one thereby _overlooks_
the other men--one consequently thinks fallaciously. So too, when
one directs one's attention to all mankind, but only considers _one_
species of impulses in them, the less egoistical ones, and excuses
them with regard to the other instincts, one may then again entertain
hopes of mankind in general and believe so far in the value of life,
consequently in this case also through fallaciousness of thought. Let
one, however, behave in this or that manner: with such behaviour one
is an _exception_ amongst men. Now, most people bear life without any
considerable grumbling, and consequently _believe_ in the value of
existence, but precisely because each one is solely self-seeking and
self-affirming, and does not step out of himself like those exceptions;
everything extra-personal is imperceptible to them, or at most seems
only a faint shadow. Therefore on this alone is based the value of
life for the ordinary everyday man, that he regards himself as more
important than the world. The great lack of imagination from which
he suffers is the reason why he cannot enter into the feelings of
other beings, and therefore sympathises as little as possible with
their fate and suffering. He, on the other hand, who really _could_
sympathise therewith, would have to despair of the value of life; were
he to succeed in comprehending and feeling in himself the general
consciousness of mankind, he would collapse with a curse on existence;
for mankind as a whole has _no_ goals, consequently man, in considering
his whole course, cannot find in it his comfort and support, but his
despair. If, in all that he does, he considers the final aimlessness
of man, his own activity assumes in his eyes the character of
wastefulness. But to feel one's self just as much wasted as humanity
(and not only as an individual) as we see the single blossom of nature
wasted, is a feeling above all other feelings. But who is capable
of it? Assuredly only a poet, and poets always know how to console
themselves.
34.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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