Human, All-Too-Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Part 2Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm
PhilosophyPhilosophy
Human, All-Too-Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Part 2
Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm
Human beings
IN THE MIRROR OF NATURE.—Is not a man fairly well described, when we are
told that he likes to walk between tall fields of golden corn: that he
prefers the forest and flower colours of sere and chilly autumn to all
others, because they point to something more beautiful than Nature has
ever attained: that he feels as much at home under big broad-leaved walnut
trees as among his nearest kinsfolk: that in the mountains his greatest
joy is to come across those tiny distant lakes from which the very eyes of
solitude seem to peer at him: that he loves that grey calm of the misty
twilight that steals along the windows on autumn and early winter evenings
and shuts out all soulless sounds as with velvet curtains: that in unhewn
stones he recognises the last remaining traces of the primeval age, eager
for speech, and honours them from childhood upwards: that, lastly, the sea
with its shifting serpent skin and wild-beast beauty is, and remains to
him, unfamiliar?—Yes, something of the man is described herewith, but the
mirror of Nature does not say that the same man, with (and not even “in
spite of”) all his idyllic sensibilities, might be disagreeable, stingy,
and conceited. Horace, who was a good judge of such matters, in his famous
_beatus ille qui procul negotiis_ puts the tenderest feeling for country
life into the mouth of a Roman money-lender.
50.
POWER WITHOUT VICTORY.—The strongest cognition (that of the complete
non-freedom of the human will) is yet the poorest in results, for it has
always had the mightiest of opponents—human vanity.
51.
PLEASURE AND ERROR.—A beneficial influence on friends is exerted by one
man unconsciously, through his nature; by another consciously, through
isolated actions. Although the former nature is held to be the higher, the
latter alone is allied to good conscience and pleasure—the pleasure in
justification by good works, which rests upon a belief in the volitional
character of our good and evil doing—that is to say, upon a mistake.
52.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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