Human Nature and Conduct: An introduction to social psychologyDewey, John
Philosophy
Human Nature and Conduct: An introduction to social psychology
Dewey, John
Habit; Social psychology
The suggestion that play and art have an indispensable moral function
which should receive an attention now denied, calls out an immediate and
vehement protest. We omit reference to that which proceeds from
professional moralists to whom art, fun and sport are habitually under
suspicion. For those interested in art, professional estheticians, will
protest even more strenuously. They at once imagine that some kind of
organized supervision if not censorship of play, drama and fiction is
contemplated which will convert them into means of moral edification. If
they do not think of Comstockian interference in the alleged interest of
public morals, they at least think that what is intended is the
elimination by persons of a Puritanic, unartistic temperament of
everything not found sufficiently earnest and elevating, a fostering of
art not for its own sake but as a means of doing good by something to
somebody. There is a natural fear of injecting into art a spirit of
earnest uplift, of surrendering art to the reformers.
But something quite other than this is meant. Relief from continuous
moral activity--in the conventional sense of moral--is itself a moral
necessity. The service of art and play is to engage and release impulses
in ways quite different from those in which they are occupied and
employed in ordinary activities. Their function is to forestall and
remedy the usual exaggerations and deficits of activity, even of "moral"
activity and to prevent a stereotyping of attention. To say that society
is altogether too careless about the moral worth of art is not to say
that carelessness about useful occupations is not a necessity for art.
On the contrary, whatever deprives play and art of their own careless
rapture thereby deprives them of their moral function. Art then becomes
poorer as art as a matter of course, but it also becomes in the same
measure less effectual in its pertinent moral office. It tries to do
what other things can do better, and it fails to do what nothing but
itself can do for human nature, softening rigidities, relaxing strains,
allaying bitterness, dispelling moroseness, and breaking down the
narrowness consequent upon specialized tasks.
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