II. _Nature_ is frequently spoken of as consisting in those passions which are strongest, and most influence the actions; which being vicious ones, mankind is in this sense naturally vicious, or vicious by nature. Thus St. Paul says of the Gentiles, _who were dead in trespasses and sins_, _and walked according to the spirit of disobedience_, _that they were by nature the children of wrath_. {6} They could be no otherwise _children of wrath_ by nature than they were vicious by nature. Here, then, are two different senses of the word _nature_, in neither of which men can at all be said to be a law to themselves. They are mentioned only to be excluded, to prevent their being confounded, as the latter is in the objection, with another sense of it, which is now to be inquired after and explained. III. The apostle asserts that the Gentiles _do by NATURE the things contained in the law_. Nature is indeed here put by way of distinction from revelation, but yet it is not a mere negative. He intends to express more than that by which they _did not_, that by which they _did_, the works of the law; namely, by _nature_. It is plain the meaning of the word is not the same in this passage as in the former, where it is spoken of as evil; for in this latter it is spoken of as good--as that by which they acted, or might have acted, virtuously. What that is in man by which he is _naturally a law to himself_ is explained in the following words: _Which show the work of the law written in their hearts_, _their consciences also bearing witness_, _and their thoughts the meanwhile accusing or else excusing one another_. If there be a distinction to be made between the _works written in their hearts_, and the _witness of conscience_, by the former must be meant the natural disposition to kindness and compassion to do what is of good report, to which this apostle often refers: that part of the nature of man, treated of in the foregoing discourse, which with very little reflection and of course leads him to society, and by means of which he naturally acts a just and good part in it, unless other passions or interest lead him astray. Yet since other passions, and regards to private interest, which lead us (though indirectly, yet they lead us) astray, are themselves in a degree equally natural, and often most prevalent, and since we have no method of seeing the particular degrees in which one or the other is placed in us by nature, it is plain the former, considered merely as natural, good and right as they are, can no more be a law to us than the latter. But there is a superior principle of reflection or conscience in every man, which distinguishes between the internal principles of his heart, as well as his external actions; which passes judgement upon himself and them, pronounces determinately some actions to be in themselves just, right, good, others to be in themselves evil, wrong, unjust: which, without