Church of England -- Sermons; Ethics; Sermons, English
which must and will flow; but the least thing imaginable will first of
all give it either this or another direction, turn it into this or that
channel: or like a fire--the nature of which, when in a heap of
combustible matter, is to spread and lay waste all around; but any one of
a thousand little accidents will occasion it to break out first either in
this or another particular part.
The subject then before us, though it does run up into, and can scarce be
treated as entirely distinct from all others, yet it needs not be so much
mixed or blended with them as it often is. Every faculty and power may
be used as the instrument of premeditated vice and wickedness, merely as
the most proper and effectual means of executing such designs. But if a
man, from deep malice and desire of revenge, should meditate a falsehood
with a settled design to ruin his neighbour's reputation, and should with
great coolness and deliberation spread it, nobody would choose to say of
such a one that he had no government of his tongue. A man may use the
faculty of speech as an instrument of false witness, who yet has so
entire a command over that faculty as never to speak but from forethought
and cool design. Here the crime is injustice and perjury, and, strictly
speaking, no more belongs to the present subject than perjury and
injustice in any other way. But there is such a thing as a disposition
to be talking for its own sake; from which persons often say anything,
good or bad, of others, merely as a subject of discourse, according to
the particular temper they themselves happen to be in, and to pass away
the present time. There is likewise to be observed in persons such a
strong and eager desire of engaging attention to what they say, that they
will speak good or evil, truth or otherwise, merely as one or the other
seems to be most hearkened to: and this though it is sometimes joined, is
not the same with the desire of being thought important and men of
consequence. There is in some such a disposition to be talking, that an
offence of the slightest kind, and such as would not raise any other
resentment, yet raises, if I may so speak, the resentment of the
tongue--puts it into a flame, into the most ungovernable motions. This
outrage, when the person it respects is present, we distinguish in the
lower rank of people by a peculiar term: and let it be observed, that
though the decencies of behaviour are a little kept, the same outrage and
virulence, indulged when he is absent, is an offence of the same kind.
But, not to distinguish any further in this manner, men race into faults
and follies which cannot so properly be referred to any one general head
as this--that they have not a due government over their tongue.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account