It is true, however, that the attempt to describe the social self and to analyze the mental processes that enter into it almost unavoidably makes it appear more reflective and “self-conscious” than it usually is. Thus while some readers will be able to discover in themselves a quite definite and deliberate contemplation of the reflected self, others will perhaps find nothing but a sympathetic impulse, so simple that it can hardly be made the object of distinct thought. Many people whose behavior shows that their idea of themselves is largely caught from the persons they are with, are yet quite innocent of any intentional posing; it is a matter of subconscious impulse or mere suggestion. The self of very sensitive but non-reflective minds is of this character. CHAPTER VI THE SOCIAL SELF—2. VARIOUS PHASES OF “I” EGOTISM AND SELFISHNESS—THE USE OF “I” IN LITERATURE AND CONVERSATION—INTENSE SELF-FEELING NECESSARY TO PRODUCTIVITY—OTHER PHASES OF THE SOCIAL SELF—PRIDE _versus_ VANITY—SELF-RESPECT, HONOR, SELF-REVERENCE—HUMILITY—MALADIES OF THE SOCIAL SELF—WITHDRAWAL—SELF-TRANSFORMATION—PHASES OF THE SELF CAUSED BY INCONGRUITY BETWEEN THE PERSON AND HIS SURROUNDINGS. If self and the self-seeking that springs from it are healthy and respectable traits of human nature, then what are those things which we call egotism and selfishness,[53] and which are so commonly regarded as objectionable? The answer to this appears to be that it is not self-assertion as such that we stigmatize by these names, but the assertion of a kind or phase of self that is obnoxious to us. So long as we agree with a man’s thoughts and aims we do not think of him as selfish or egotistical, however urgently he may assert them; but so soon as we cease to agree, while he continues persistent and perhaps intrusive, we are likely to say hard things about him. It is at bottom a matter of moral judgment, not to be comprised in any simple definition, but to be determined by conscience after the whole situation is taken into account. In this regard it is essentially one with the more general question of misconduct or personal badness. There is no distinct line between the behavior which we mildly censure as selfish and that which we call wicked or criminal; it is only a matter of degree. It is quite apparent that mere self-assertion is not looked upon as selfishness. There is nothing more respected—and even liked—than a persistent and successful pursuit of one’s peculiar aims, so long as this is done within the accepted limits of fairness and consideration for others. Thus one who has acquired ten millions must have expressed his appropriative instinct with much energy and constancy, but reasonable people do not conclude that he is selfish unless it appears that he has ignored social sentiments by which he should have been guided. If he has been dishonest, mean, hard, or the like, they will condemn him.