Human nature and the social orderCooley, Charles Horton
Science
Human nature and the social order
Cooley, Charles Horton
Individualism; Social psychology; Sociology
Selfishness as a mental trait is always some sort of narrowness,
littleness or defect; an inadequacy of imagination. The perfectly
balanced and vigorous mind can hardly be selfish, because it cannot be
oblivious to any important social situation, either in immediate
intercourse or in more permanent relations; it must always tend to be
sympathetic, fair, and just, because it possesses that breadth and unity
of view of which these qualities are the natural expression. To lack
them is to be not altogether social and human, and may be regarded as
the beginning of degeneracy. Egotism is then not something additional to
ordinary human nature, as the common way of speaking suggests, but
rather a lack. The egotist is not more than a man, but less than a man;
and as regards personal power he is as a rule the weaker for his
egotism. The very fact that he has a bad name shows that the world is
against him, and that he is contending against odds. The success of
selfishness attracts attention and exaggeration because it is hateful to
us; but the really strong generally work within the prevalent standards
of justice and courtesy, and so escape condemnation.
There is infinite variety in egotism; but an important division may be
based on the greater or less stability of the egotists’ characters.
According to this we may divide them into those of the unstable type and
those of the rigid type. Extreme instability is always selfish; the very
weak cannot be otherwise, because they lack both the deep sympathy that
enables people to penetrate the lives of others, and the consistency and
self-control necessary to make sympathy effective if they had it. Their
superficial and fleeting impulses are as likely to work harm as good and
cannot be trusted to bring forth any sound fruit. If they are amiable at
times they are sure to be harsh, cold, or violent at other times; there
is no justice, no solid good or worth in them. The sort of people I have
in mind are, for instance, such as in times of affliction go about
weeping and wringing their hands to the neglect of their duty to aid and
comfort the survivors, possibly taking credit for the tenderness of
their hearts.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account