Human nature and the social orderCooley, Charles Horton
Science
Human nature and the social order
Cooley, Charles Horton
Individualism; Social psychology; Sociology
A tendency to secretiveness very often goes with this self-cherishing.
Goethe was as amorous and jealous about his unpublished works, in some
cases, as the master of a seraglio; fostering them for years, and
sometimes not telling his closest friends of their existence. His
Eugenie, “meine Liebling Eugenie,” as he calls it, was vulgarized and
ruined for him by his fatal mistake in publishing the first part before
the whole was complete. It would not be difficult to show that the same
cherishing of favorite and peculiar ideas is found also in painters,
sculptors, and effective persons of every sort. As was suggested in an
earlier chapter, this secretiveness has a social reference, and few
works of art could be carried through if the artist was convinced they
would have no value in the eyes of anyone else. He hides his work that
he may purify and perfect it, thus making it at once more wholly and
delightfully his own and also more valuable to the world in the end. As
soon as the painter exhibits his picture he loses it, in a sense; his
system of ideas about it becomes more or less confused and disorganized
by the inrush of impressions arising from a sense of what other people
think of it; it is no longer the perfect and intimate thing which his
thought cherished, but has become somewhat crude, vulgar, and
disgusting, so that if he is sensitive he may wish never to look upon it
again. This, I take it, is why Goethe could not finish Eugenie, and why
Guignet, a French painter, of whom Hamerton speaks, used to alter or
throw away a painting that anyone by chance saw upon the easel. Likewise
it was in order more perfectly to know and express himself—in his book
called “A Week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers”—that Thoreau retired
to Walden Pond, and it was doubtless with the same view that Descartes
quitted Paris and dwelt for eight years in Holland, concealing even his
place of residence. The Self, like a child, is not likely to hold its
own in the world unless it has had a mature prenatal development.
It may be said, perhaps, that these views contradict a well-known fact,
namely, that we do our best work when we are not self-conscious, not
thinking about effect, but filled with disinterested and impersonal
passion. Such truth as there is in this idea is, however, in no way
inconsistent with what has just been said. It is true that a certain
abandonment and self-forgetting is often characteristic of high thought
and noble action. But there would be no production, no high thought or
noble action, if we relied entirely upon these impassioned moments
without preparing ourselves to have them. It is only as we have
self-consciousness that we can be aware of those special tendencies
which we assert in production, or can learn how to express them, or even
have the desire to do so. The moment of insight would be impossible
without the persistent self-conscious endeavor that preceded it, nor has
enthusiastic action any value without a similar discipline.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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