Human nature and the social orderCooley, Charles Horton
Science
Human nature and the social order
Cooley, Charles Horton
Individualism; Social psychology; Sociology
It is true, also, that in sensitive persons self-feeling often reaches a
pitch of irritability that impedes production, or vulgarizes it through
too great deference to opinion. But this is a matter of the control and
discipline of particular aspects of the self rather than of its general
tendency. When undisciplined this sort of feeling may be futile or
harmful, just as fear, whose function is to cause us to avoid danger,
may defeat its own aim through excessive and untimely operation, and
anger may so excite us that we lose the power of inflicting injury.
If the people of our time and country are peculiarly selfish, as is
sometimes alleged, it is certainly not because a too rigid or clearly
differentiated type of self-consciousness is general among us. On the
contrary, our most characteristic fault is perhaps a certain
superficiality and vagueness of character and aims; and this seems to
spring from a lack of collectedness and self-definition, which in turn
is connected with the too eager mode of life common among us. I doubt,
however, whether egotism, which is essentially a falling short of moral
standards, can be said to be more prevalent in one age than another.
In Mr. Roget’s “Thesaurus” may be found about six pages devoted to words
denoting “Extrinsic personal affections, or personal affections derived
from the opinions or feelings of others,” an expression which seems to
mean nearly the same as is here meant by social self-feeling of the
reflected or looking-glass sort. Although the compiler fishes with a
wide net and brings in much that seems hardly to belong here, the number
of words in common use indicating different varieties of this sort of
feeling is surprising and suggestive. One cannot but think, What insight
and what happy boldness of invention went to the devising of all these
terms! What a psychologist is language, that thus labels and treasures
up so many subtle aspects of the human mind!
We may profitably distinguish, as others have done, two general
attitudes—the aggressive or self-assertive and the shrinking or humble.
The first indicates that one thinks favorably of himself and tries to
impose that favorable thought on others; the second, that he accepts and
yields to a depreciating reflection of himself, and feels accordingly
diminished and abased. Pride would, of course, be an example of the
first way of feeling and acting, humility of the second.
But there are many phases of the aggressive self, and these, again,
might be classified something as follows: first, in response to imagined
approval we have pride, vanity, or self-respect; second, in response to
imagined censure we have various sorts of resentment; and the humble
self might be treated in a similar manner.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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