Human nature and the social orderCooley, Charles Horton
Science
Human nature and the social order
Cooley, Charles Horton
Individualism; Social psychology; Sociology
Thomas Huxley, to take a name known to all, was a man in whom there was
much fruitful hostility. He did not seek controversy, but when the
enemies of truth offered battle he felt no inclination to refuse; and he
avowed—perhaps with a certain zest in contravening conventional
teaching—that he loved his friends and hated his enemies.[69] His hatred
was of a noble sort, and the reader of his Life and Letters can hardly
doubt that he was a good as well as a great man, or that his pugnacity
helped him to be such. Indeed I do not think that science or letters
could do without the spirit of opposition, although much energy is
dissipated and much thought clouded by it. Even men like Darwin or
Emerson, who seem to wish nothing more than to live at peace with
everyone, may be observed to develop their views with unusual fulness
and vigor where they are most in opposition to authority. There is
something analogous to political parties in all intellectual activity;
opinion divides, more or less definitely, into opposing groups, and each
side is stimulated by the opposition of the other to define,
corroborate, and amend its views, with the purpose of justifying itself
before the constituency to which it appeals. What we need is not that
controversy should disappear, but that it should be carried on with
sincere and absolute deference to the standard of truth.
A just resentment is not only a needful stimulus to aggressive
righteousness, but has also a wholesome effect upon the mind of the
person against whom it is directed, by awakening a feeling of the
importance of the sentiments he has transgressed. On the higher planes
of life an imaginative sense that there is resentment in the minds of
other persons performs the same function that physical resistance does
upon the lower.[70] It is an attack upon my mental self, and as a
sympathetic and imaginative being I feel it more than I would a mere
blow; it forces me to consider the other’s view, and either to accept it
or to bear it down by the stronger claims of a different one. Thus it
enters potently into our moral judgments.
“Let such pure hate still underprop
Our love that we may be
Each other’s conscience.”[71]
I think that no one’s character and aims can be respected unless he is
perceived to be capable of some sort of resentment. We feel that if he
is really in earnest about anything he should feel hostile emotion if it
is attacked, and if he gives no sign of this, either at the moment of
attack or later, he and what he represents become despised. No teacher,
for instance, can maintain discipline unless his scholars feel that he
will in some manner resent a breach of it.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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