Human nature and the social orderCooley, Charles Horton
Science
Human nature and the social order
Cooley, Charles Horton
Individualism; Social psychology; Sociology
The books on child-study give many instances of the surprising
allegiance which children often give to rule, merely as rule, and even
an intermittent observer will be sure to corroborate them. Thus a child
five years old, when on a visit, was invited to “open his mouth and shut
his eyes,” and upon his doing so a piece of candy was put into the
former. When he tasted it he pulled it out and exclaimed, “Mamma don’t
want me to have candy.” Now this did not seem to be affectation, nor was
the child other than fond of sweets, nor afraid of punishment or blame;
he was simply under the control of a need for mental consistency. The
no-candy rule had been promulgated and enforced at home; he had adopted
it as part of his system of thought, and, when it was broken, his moral
sense, otherwise the harmony of his mind, was shocked to a degree that
the sweet taste of the candy could not overcome. Again, R. was subjected
nearly every evening for several years to a somewhat painful operation
called “bending his foot,” intended to correct a slight deformity. After
becoming accustomed to this he would sometimes protest and even cry if
it were proposed to omit it. I thought I could see that moral allegiance
to a rule, merely as such, weakened as he grew older; and the
explanation of this I took to be that the increasing competition of
suggestions and conflict of precepts made this simple, mechanical unity
impossible, and so forced the mind, still striving for harmony, to exert
its higher organizing activity and attempt a larger sort of unification.
It is the same principle as that which prevents the civilized man from
retaining the simple allegiance to rule and habit that the savage has;
his complex life cannot be unified in this way, any more than his
accounts can be notched on a stick; and he is forced, if he is to
achieve any unity of life, to seek it in some more elaborate standard of
behavior. Under uniform conditions the habitual is the rational, and
therefore the moral; but under complex conditions this ceases to be the
case.
Of course this way of looking at the matter does not do away with all
the difficulties involved in it, but does, it seems to me, put habitual
and other morality on the common ground of rationality, and show the
apparently sharp division between them to be an illusion.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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