Human nature and the social orderCooley, Charles Horton
Science
Human nature and the social order
Cooley, Charles Horton
Individualism; Social psychology; Sociology
The best definition of freedom is perhaps nothing other than the most
helpful way of thinking about it; and it seems to me that the most
helpful way of thinking about it is to regard it in the light of the
contrast between what a man is and what he might be, as our experience
of life enables us to imagine the two states. Ideas of this sort are
suggested by defining freedom as opportunity, and their tendency is to
stimulate and direct practical endeavor. If the word helps us to
realize, for instance, that it is possible to make healthy, intelligent,
and hopeful children out of those that are now sickly, dull, and
unhappy, so much the better. On the other hand, the definition of it as
letting people alone, well enough suited, perhaps, to an over-governed
state of society, does not seem especially pertinent to our time and
country.
We have always been taught by philosophy that the various forms of the
good were merely different views of the same thing, and this idea is
certainly applicable to such notions as those of freedom, progress, and
right. Thus freedom may be regarded as merely the individual aspect of
progress, the two being related as the individual and the social order
were asserted to be in the first chapter, and no more distinct or
separable. If instead of contrasting what a particular man is with what
he might be, we do the same for mankind as a whole, we have the notion
of progress. Progress which does not involve liberation is evidently no
progress at all; and, on the other hand, a freedom that is not part of
the general onward movement of society is not free in the largest sense.
Again, any practicable idea of freedom must connect it with some
standard of right, in which, like opposing claims in a clearing-house,
the divergent tendencies of each person, and of different persons, are
disciplined and reconciled. The wrong is the unfree; it is that which
tends, on the whole, to restrict personal development. It is no
contribution to freedom to turn loose the insane or the criminal, or to
allow children to run on the streets instead of going to school. The
only test of all these things—of right, freedom, progress, and the
like—is the instructed conscience; just as the only test of beauty is a
trained æsthetic sense, which is a mental conclusion of much the same
sort as conscience.
So far as discipline is concerned, freedom means not its absence but the
use of higher and more rational forms as contrasted with those that are
lower or less rational. A free discipline controls the individual by
appealing to his reason and conscience, and therefore to his
self-respect; while an unfree control works upon some lower phase of the
mind, and so tends to degrade him. It is freedom to be disciplined in as
rational a manner as you are fit for.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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