Human nature and the social orderCooley, Charles Horton
Science
Human nature and the social order
Cooley, Charles Horton
Individualism; Social psychology; Sociology
Since “I” is known to our experience primarily as a feeling, or as a
feeling-ingredient in our ideas, it cannot be described or defined
without suggesting that feeling. We are sometimes likely to fall into a
formal and empty way of talking regarding questions of emotion, by
attempting to define that which is in its nature primary and
indefinable. A formal definition of self-feeling, or indeed of any sort
of feeling, must be as hollow as a formal definition of the taste of
salt, or the color red; we can expect to know what it is only by
experiencing it. There can be no final test of the self except the way
we feel; it is that toward which we have the “my” attitude. But as this
feeling is quite as familiar to us and as easy to recall as the taste of
salt or the color red, there should be no difficulty in understanding
what is meant by it. One need only imagine some attack on his “me,” say
ridicule of his dress or an attempt to take away his property or his
child, or his good name by slander, and self-feeling immediately
appears. Indeed, he need only pronounce, with strong emphasis, one of
the self-words, like “I” or “my,” and self-feeling will be recalled by
association. Another good way is to enter by sympathy into some
self-assertive state of mind depicted in literature; as, for instance,
into that of Coriolanus when, having been sneered at as a “boy of
tears,” he cries out:
“Boy!...
If you have writ your annals true, ’tis there,
That, like an eagle in a dovecote, I
Fluttered your Volscians in Corioli;
Alone I did it.—Boy!”
Here is a self indeed, which no one can fail to feel, though he might be
unable to describe it. What a ferocious scream of the outraged ego is
that “I” at the end of the second line!
So much is written on this topic that ignores self-feeling and thus
deprives “self” of all vivid and palpable meaning, that I feel it
permissible to add a few more passages in which this feeling is forcibly
expressed. Thus in Lowell’s poem, “A Glance Behind the Curtain,”
Cromwell says:
“I, perchance,
Am one raised up by the Almighty arm
To witness some great truth to all the world.”
And his Columbus, on the bow of his vessel, soliloquizes:
“Here am I, with no friend but the sad sea,
The beating heart of this great enterprise,
Which, without me, would stiffen in swift death.”
And so the “I am the way” which we read in the New Testament is surely
the expression of a sentiment not very different from these. In the
following we have a more plaintive sentiment of self:
_Philoctetes._— And know’st thou not, O boy, whom thou dost see?
_Neoptolemus._— How can I know a man I ne’er beheld?
_Philoctetes._— And didst thou never hear my name, nor fame
Of these my ills, in which I pined away?
_Neoptolemus._— Know that I nothing know of what thou ask’st.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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