Human nature and the social orderCooley, Charles Horton
Science
Human nature and the social order
Cooley, Charles Horton
Individualism; Social psychology; Sociology
_Philoctetes._— O crushed with many woes, and of the Gods
Hated am I, of whom, in this my woe,
No rumor travelled homeward, nor went forth
Through any clime of Hellas.[39]
We all have thoughts of the same sort as these, and yet it is possible
to talk so coldly or mystically about the self that one begins to forget
that there is, really, any such thing.
But perhaps the best way to realize the naïve meaning of “I” is to
listen to the talk of children playing together, especially if they do
not agree very well. They use the first person with none of the
conventional self-repression of their elders, but with much emphasis and
variety of inflection, so that its emotional animus is unmistakable.
Self-feeling of a reflective and agreeable sort, an appropriative zest
of contemplation, is strongly suggested by the word “gloating.” To
gloat, in this sense, is as much as to think “mine, mine, mine,” with a
pleasant warmth of feeling. Thus a boy gloats over something he has made
with his scroll-saw, over the bird he has brought down with his gun, or
over his collection of stamps or eggs; a girl gloats over her new
clothes, and over the approving words or looks of others; a farmer over
his fields and his stock; a business man over his trade and his bank
account; a mother over her child; the poet over a successful quatrain;
the self-righteous man over the state of his soul; and in like manner
everyone gloats over the prosperity of any cherished idea.
I would not be understood as saying that self-feeling is clearly marked
off in experience from other kinds of feeling; but it is, perhaps, as
definite in this regard as anger, fear, grief, and the like. To quote
Professor James, “The emotions themselves of self-satisfaction and
abasement are of a unique sort, each as worthy to be classed as a
primitive emotional species as are, for example, rage or pain.”[40] It
is true here, as wherever mental facts are distinguished, that there are
no fences, but that one thing merges by degrees into another. Yet if “I”
did not denote an idea much the same in all minds and fairly
distinguishable from other ideas, it could not be used freely and
universally as a means of communication.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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