Human nature and the social orderCooley, Charles Horton
Science
Human nature and the social order
Cooley, Charles Horton
Individualism; Social psychology; Sociology
That the “I” of common speech has a meaning which includes some sort of
reference to other persons is involved in the very fact that the word
and the ideas it stands for are phenomena of language and the
communicative life. It is doubtful whether it is possible to use
language at all without thinking more or less distinctly of someone
else, and certainly the things to which we give names and which have a
large place in reflective thought are almost always those which are
impressed upon us by our contact with other people. Where there is no
communication there can be no nomenclature and no developed thought.
What we call “me,” “mine,” or “myself” is, then, not something separate
from the general life, but the most interesting part of it, a part whose
interest arises from the very fact that it is both general and
individual. That is, we care for it just because it is that phase of the
mind that is living and striving in the common life, trying to impress
itself upon the minds of others. “I” is a militant social tendency,
working to hold and enlarge its place in the general current of
tendencies. So far as it can it waxes, as all life does. To think of it
as apart from society is a palpable absurdity of which no one could be
guilty who really _saw_ it as a fact of life.
“Der Mensch erkennt sich nur im Menschen, nur
Das Leben lehret jedem was er sei.”[41]
If a thing has no relation to others of which one is conscious he is
unlikely to think of it at all, and if he does think of it he cannot, it
seems to me, regard it as emphatically _his_. The appropriative sense is
always the shadow, as it were, of the common life, and when we have it
we have a sense of the latter in connection with it. Thus, if we think
of a secluded part of the woods as “ours,” it is because we think, also,
that others do not go there. As regards the body I doubt if we have a
vivid my-feeling about any part of it which is not thought of, however
vaguely, as having some actual or possible reference to someone else.
Intense self-consciousness regarding it arises along with instincts or
experiences which connect it with the thought of others. Internal
organs, like the liver, are not thought of as peculiarly ours unless we
are trying to communicate something regarding them, as, for instance,
when they are giving us trouble and we are trying to get sympathy.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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