Human nature and the social orderCooley, Charles Horton
Science
Human nature and the social order
Cooley, Charles Horton
Individualism; Social psychology; Sociology
The social self is simply any idea, or system of ideas, drawn from the
communicative life, that the mind cherishes as its own. Self-feeling has
its chief scope _within_ the general life, not outside of it, the
special endeavor or tendency of which it is the emotional aspect finding
its principal field of exercise in a world of personal forces, reflected
in the mind by a world of personal impressions.
As connected with the thought of other persons it is always a
consciousness of the peculiar or differentiated aspect of one’s life,
because that is the aspect that has to be sustained by purpose and
endeavor, and its more aggressive forms tend to attach themselves to
whatever one finds to be at once congenial to one’s own tendencies and
at variance with those of others with whom one is in mental contact. It
is here that they are most needed to serve their function of stimulating
characteristic activity, of fostering those personal variations which
the general plan of life seems to require. Heaven, says Shakespeare,
doth divide
“The state of man in divers functions,
Setting endeavor in continual motion,”
and self-feeling is one of the means by which this diversity is
achieved.
Agreeably to this view we find that the aggressive self manifests itself
most conspicuously in an appropriativeness of objects of common desire,
corresponding to the individual’s need of power over such objects to
secure his own peculiar development, and to the danger of opposition
from others who also need them. And this extends from material objects
to lay hold, in the same spirit, of the attentions and affections of
other people, of all sorts of plans and ambitions, including the noblest
special purposes the mind can entertain, and indeed of any conceivable
idea which may come to seem a part of one’s life and in need of
assertion against someone else. The attempt to limit the word self and
its derivatives to the lower aims of personality is quite arbitrary; at
variance with common-sense as expressed by the emphatic use of “I” in
connection with the sense of duty and other high motives, and
unphilosophical as ignoring the function of the self as the organ of
specialized endeavor of higher as well as lower kinds.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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