Humanism and America : $b Essays on the outlook of modern civilisation
Philosophy
Humanism and America : $b Essays on the outlook of modern civilisation
Humanism; Literature -- Philosophy; Philosophy, Modern; United States -- Civilization -- 20th century
If a scientific prediction, or law, is to be something more than a
vague statement of what will probably occur, we feel the necessity
of measuring the quantity of the event; that is, our minds are not
satisfied until we are able to express it mathematically. Since the
only measurable attributes, concerning which our opinion of more or
less is definite, are geometrical lengths, the aim of all science is,
and must be, to express its laws in the language of mechanics; for that
subject alone deals exclusively with simple, sensible masses and their
geometrical relations in space. We have then the paradox that while
mathematics is the goal of science, in that it is the ideal method,
or language of expression, it is not itself a science since it is
concerned with subjective ideas and is not limited by the restrictions
of sensible bodies. Modern men of science may rebel against this fact;
but even the newer, and more dubious, of the pseudo-sciences are
forced to substantiate their claims with the support of factitious
mathematical formulæ and tables and to simulate the mechanistic method.
The inevitable tendency of science is to investigate all phenomena
quantitatively, and to view the whole universe as a vast and measurable
machine.
If the phenomena of life are to be classed as an exact science, it is
necessary to postulate that the living organism, also, is a machine,--a
thing of various material parts, acting on each other by mechanical
forces. Such a postulate is pure _fiat_, for we have found no common
factors between what we call vital actions and mechanical and physical
forces. Biology is, at best, confined to the discovery of qualitative
classifications, and the mutual chemical and physical reactions of
the organism; and life is so complex and so variable that very few of
its phenomena can be predicted with any accuracy. For example, the
so-called law of heredity is often cited, but we have made scarcely
any progress towards predicting variations in even an immediately
succeeding generation. Even if a general law of progressive evolution
were granted to have been established, no one could foretell by it the
future variations of any species.
If the scientific method is badly strained when applied to even the
simplest forms of life, it completely fails when used to elucidate the
phenomena of the mind. The fundamental definition of science excludes
the processes of consciousness from its field, for it assumes that
objective phenomena are to be interpreted by the mind. If we attempt to
study the mind objectively, then we come face to face with the absurd
paradox of a thing investigating itself by means of I itself. And the
gibe cast at the scientific psychologists, that they propose to study
the mind by first denying its existence, is only too well founded.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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