[98] Cf. the second sentence of the present essay. [99] _Henri Bergson: The Philosophy of Change_, p. 14. [100] This title has been given to the English translation of the _Essai sur les donnes_, etc. [101] Possibly this representation of Leibniz’s thought requires a word of explanation. Leibniz expresses the nature of reality in terms of force, on one hand, and of consciousness on the other. The monad or elemental reality is a unit of perception and also a unit of force. It is a living unit; as in Bergsonism, reality is life, though life in Leibniz’s philosophy is ultimately plural instead of a simple impetus. It is true that will is not a characteristic Leibnizian term, but existence is always, I think, conceived by him very clearly as _conation_. The self-realization of the monad is at the same time an intensification of its perceptiveness and of its dynamic. Cf. the following passages from Rogers’ _Student’s History of Philosophy_, pp. 307-8: “Leibniz was led by various motives to substitute, for extension, _power of resistance_, as the essential quality of matter.... But when, instead of extension, we characterize matter as _force_, a means of connection [between matter and mind] is opened up. For force has its analogue in the conscious life; corresponding to the activity of matter is conscious activity or will. Indeed, are there any positive terms in which we can describe the nature of force, unless we conceive it as identical with that conscious activity which we know directly in ourselves?” This activity, then, “Is at bottom, when we interpret it, a spiritual or perceptual activity.” In short, it is will. Leibniz is properly regarded as the first modern spiritualist. Leibnizian matter is real, if you like, but then it is continuous, and of essentially identical nature, with spirit. Matter is spirit in a low stage of development. Bergson has no such clear and unambiguous conception of matter as this, when you consider the whole or his doctrine; but there are passages in Bergson which might almost have been written by Leibniz himself. For instance: ... “if, in fact, the humblest function of spirit is to bind together the successive moments of the duration of things, if it is by this that it comes into contact with matter and by this also that it is first of all distinguished from matter, we can conceive an infinite number of degrees between matter and fully developed spirit--a spirit capable of action which is not only undetermined, but also reasonable and reflective.” (_Matter and Memory_, pp. 295-6.) [102] There is a good discussion of this point in an article reviewing the _Essai_, by L. Levy-Bruhl, in the _Revue Philosophique_, Vol. XXIX (1890), pp. 513-538. [103] Cf. below, pp. 57, 58. [104] Pages 72, 73, 97. Professor Perry’s analysis of the conception of immediacy (_Present Philosophical Tendencies_, Chapter X) has a result that is similar in principle to the above. [105] _Op. cit._, p. 525.