[106] _Time and Free Will_, pp. 118-119. [107] But Bergson apparently does not see that even the word “interpenetrate” falls to express anything radically different in temporal “multiplicity” from a certain character of spatial multiplicity. Cf. pp. 62, 101. In this, as in all its argument, intuitionism arguing is inevitably intuitionism contradicting itself. It is ineffable philosophy (see _Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods_, Vol. IV, p. 123.) [108] The living ego is a fact-in-the-accomplishing. You cannot really discourse about it! If psychology ever seems to manage this (and if this present book of Bergson’s seems to manage it), the ego discoursed about is, in that fact, proven to be not the concrete and living ego at all, but the impersonal and objective one. [109] The attitude, that is, of intuition, which we have called the temporal attitude. The terms “spatial,” “logical,” “conceptual,” applied here so often to the word “thought,” are epithets of thought generally. There is no thought, in any meaning of the word more specific than “consciousness,” that is not logical, conceptual and spatial in this Bergsonian sense. If we cannot conceptualize our psychic facts, we cannot think them, then--the meaning is the same. But if we say that anything (which we name and, in the saying, define and think) is unnamable, indefinable and cannot be thought, we contradict ourselves. The doctrine, if true, must mean something that is not a self-contradiction. Does it mean that what we name and discourse about is only the spatialized symbol of the psychic fact? There can be little doubt. I think, that this is Bergson’s meaning; but then the psychic fact is of such a nature as to be symbolized; and the distinction between a symbol and a name, by virtue of which a thing which can be symbolized may not be namable, requires explanation. [110] _Present Philosophical Tendencies_, pp. 232-4. [111] Pp. 42, 43. Cf. also below, p. 93. [112] _Op. cit._, p. 128. [113] _Time and Free Will_, p. 98. [114] _Time and Free Will_, p. 113. [115] Cf. above, p. 58. [116] In order to give any meaning to the term “compenetrating” or “interpenetration” (which I take to be mutually equivalent, in Bergson’s use), I am compelled to interpret them as synonymous with the “compactness” of a continuum--as synonymous. In fact, with “continuity.” Bergson does not make clear how these terms can mean anything else (cf. below, p. 101.) [117] Bergson himself, of course, is perfectly aware--_in other connections_--of the continuity of space! [118] _Creative Evolution_, p. 1. [119] _Ibid._, p. 4. [120] _Ibid._, p. 208. [121] _Ibid._, p. 248. [122] _Ibid._, p. 247. [123] _Jour. Phil. Psy. and Sci. Meth._, Vol. V, No. 22. [124] _Creative Evolution_, p. 251. [125] _Ibid._, p. 269. [126] Cf. Perry’s comment, _Present Philosophical Tendencies_, p. 235. [127] _Creative Evolution_, p. 175. [128] _Ibid._, p. 144. [129] _Ibid._, pp. 176, 177.