Iamblichus' Life of Pythagoras, or Pythagoric Life: Accompanied by Fragments of the Ethical Writings of certain Pythagoreans in the Doric dialect; and a collection of Pythagoric Sentences from Stobaeus and others, which are omitted by Gale in his Opuscula Mythologica, and have not been noticed by any editorIamblichus
Philosophy
Iamblichus' Life of Pythagoras, or Pythagoric Life: Accompanied by Fragments of the Ethical Writings of certain Pythagoreans in the Doric dialect; and a collection of Pythagoric Sentences from Stobaeus and others, which are omitted by Gale in his Opuscula Mythologica, and have not been noticed by any editor
Iamblichus
Ethics, Ancient; Philosophers -- Greece -- Biography; Philosophy, Ancient; Pythagoras; Pythagoras and Pythagorean school
But that the rest of things are only homonymously
beings, and are so denominated through the participation of real beings,
and such are corporeal and material forms, which are generated and
corrupted, and never truly are. And that wisdom is the science of things
which are properly beings, but not of such as are homonymously so. For
corporeal natures are neither the objects of science nor admit of a
stable knowledge, since they are infinite and incomprehensible by
science, and are as it were, non-beings, when compared with universals,
and are incapable of being properly circumscribed by definition. It is
impossible however to conceive that there should be science of things
which are not naturally the objects of science. Hence it is not probable
that there will be a desire of science which has no subsistence, but
rather that desire will be extended to things which are properly beings,
which exist with invariable permanency, and are always consubsistent
with a true appellation. For it happens that the perception of things
which are homonymously beings, and which are never truly what they seem
to be, follows the apprehension of real beings; just as the knowledge of
particulars follows the science of universals. For he who knows
universals properly, says Archytas, will also have a clear perception of
the nature of particulars. Hence things which have an existence are not
alone, nor only-begotten, nor simple, but they are seen to be various
and multiform. For some of them are intelligible and incorporeal
natures, and which are denominated beings; but others are corporeal and
fall under the perception of sense, and by participation communicate
with that which has a real existence. Concerning all these therefore, he
delivered the most appropriate sciences, and left nothing [pertaining to
them] uninvestigated. _He likewise unfolded to men those sciences which
are common_ [_to all disciplines_,] as for instance the demonstrative,
the definitive, and that which consists in dividing, as may be known
from the Pythagoric commentaries. He was also accustomed to pour forth
sentences resembling Oracles to his familiars in a symbolical manner,
and which in the greatest brevity of words contained the most abundant
and multifarious meaning, like the Pythian Apollo through certain
oracles, or like nature herself through seeds small in bulk, the former
exhibiting conceptions, and the latter effects, innumerable in
multitude, and difficult to be understood. Of this kind is the sentence,
_The beginning is the half of the whole_, which is an apothegm of
Pythagoras himself. But not only in the present hemistich, but in others
of a similar nature, the most divine Pythagoras has concealed the sparks
of truth; depositing as in a treasury for those who are capable of being
enkindled by them, and with a certain brevity of diction, an extension
of theory most ample and difficult to be comprehended, as in the
following hemistich:
All things accord in number:
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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