I am of opinion, that for one reason the Secrets of a Commonwealth are better concealed, which is; because that those that are conscious to them, are themselves the Princes and Masters of the State: but in a Monarchy, the Prince being forced to trust some of his Subjects, it is much more dangerous for him and for his business; for he becomes slave and dependent of those who should be his. Divers Histories will furnish us with examples to prove what we say; and if that be true, and that yet nevertheless it is very hard to keep counsel in a Commonwealth, it is easily inferr’d, how difficult a thing it is to do it in a Monarchy. But what shall we say then of the state of the Church, of which no body can tell whether it be Commonwealth, or Monarchy, the _Popes_ appearing sometimes absolute like Princes, and other while dependent like Dukes of Commonwealths; and without doubt the _Popes_ could never be able to conceal so many private and publick interests without that trust and relyance, which they have in their _Nipotismo_: and this particularly for two reasons. The first is thus. The Court of _Rome_ taken in all its latitude, is without doubt the greatest of _Europe_, and the most magnificent of Christendom; for it yields to no other in the great number of Ambassadours, and publick Ministers which reside in it. For the _Popes_, that they may the better conserve the title of Universal Father, which they affect, do by all means procure to have as many Ambassadors of Christian Princes near them as they can. But that very thing by which this Court seems to be most honoured, does also carry with it an evident danger; for these Ambassadours and Residents being unwilling to stay in _Rome_, without procuring some considerable advantage to the Princes that send them, are perpetually watching for occasions to discover the _Popes_ most secret designs: so that they are in effect so many spyes, who the more they are in number, the more do they encrease the difficulty of preserving and concealing the Secrets of the Court. Before I speak of the second Reason, which makes the Court of _Rome_ so suspicious a place for Secrets, I must say something about the Cardinals, and their Office, and Employment. The Cardinals are the _Pope’s_ Counsellors, who by the Dignity of their place, and the Majesty of their Habit, do much augment the pomp and splendor of the Court. The _Popes_ do every day give them new Priviledges and Prerogatives, by the means of which they are respected like so many Kings. This makes Forreign Princes endeavour to get their friendship by all means, giving them both secret and publick allowances and Pensions, in consideration of these Prerogatives, and of the power which they have to chuse the _Pope_; who must necessarily be one of their number.