The considerations which prevailed on former occasions still held good when Korea offered this new affront. The peace party, of which Marquis Ito and Count Inouye were prominent members—the former being also a member of the Cabinet—thought that it was Japan’s first duty to devote all her energies to the task of domestic improvement, while cultivating friendly relations with her neighbors. The problem which confronted the advocates of peace was not an easy one. Saigo was in retirement in his native province, surrounded by his devoted supporters, and it was easily to be seen that he would take umbrage if this new insult was allowed to pass unavenged, and would possibly make it the pretext for something more serious than mere remonstrance. The decision in favor of peace instead of war required a high order of courage. The state of public feeling on the subject and the powerful opposition on which the Government had to count was well illustrated by a petition presented nearly a year later by the Tosa Association, over the signature of Kataoka Kenkichi, afterward speaker of the Lower House of the Diet. Animadverting upon the Government’s action, the petition said: Our people knew that Korea is a country with which Japan has had intercourse since the most ancient times. Suddenly the intercourse was broken off, and when we sent an envoy thither he was befooled and all his proposals were rejected. Not only were the Koreans insulting, but they threatened hostile resistance. It was proposed to send a second envoy to remonstrate (?) against the treatment of the former one, but the government suddenly changed its views and nothing further was done. The people when they learned this became enraged, and their feelings found vent in the rebellion of the samurai of Saga. This petition no doubt accurately reflects the state of public feeling at the time to which it refers. The Government did not, however, yield to the popular clamor for war, and this was due in no small measure to the efforts of Marquis Ito. He counselled patience and advised his colleagues from the outset that advantage should be taken of the opportunity to place the relations of Japan and Korea upon a new basis by means of a treaty of peace and friendship. These moderate counsels prevailed and the Cabinet decided with the Imperial sanction to make the treaty, although two of its members, Shimadzu Saburo and Itagaki subsequently resigned.