Marquis Ito fully appreciated the obstacles which the alleged suzerainty of China opposed to the establishment of satisfactory treaty relations between Japan and Korea. Accordingly he devoted himself, with the assistance of M. Boissonade, the distinguished French publicist, and of Mr. Inouye, the well-known Japanese authority, to a careful study of this question. The decision reached was that the bond uniting China and Korea was not, either historically or according to the rules of international law, that of suzerain and vassal state. It therefore logically followed that Korea must be approached directly and dealt with as an independent Power. The importance of this decision cannot be overestimated. It was the first formal recognition of Korean national independence. More than that, it was the declaration on the part of Japan of a policy having in view the political, commercial and economical progress of her neighbor. By the treaty of 1876 Japan abandoned all of her own ancient claims to suzerainty and did what she could to place Korea upon the high road to prosperous national development which she herself was travelling. No friend of Japan will claim that it was an entirely altruistic policy. Her action was dictated as much by motives of intelligent self-interest as by consideration for Korea. The fate of the peninsular kingdom was of vital importance to Japan. As an appanage of China its condition was hazardous. China had from ancient times claimed suzerainty over all surrounding nations, but those claims had never proved a safeguard nor prevented the subjugation or absorption of these so-called vassal states by other Powers. In fact, they were an element of weakness in quarrels where China herself was principal; for it might easily happen that the vassal would be exposed to attack, in case China herself could not easily be reached. This was especially the truth as regarded Korea, concerning whom China had given direct proof that while prepared to claim all the prerogatives of suzerainty when it implied no risk to herself, she was only too likely, when a strong Power threatened, to shirk all responsibility and abandon Korea to her fate. To treat with Korea as an independent nation and thus to set an example which would in all likelihood be followed by other Powers, seemed the best way of avoiding such a catastrophe. At the same time there was good reason to hope, even confidently to expect, that Korea, drawn into intimate intercourse with the world, would be freed from the trammels which prevented progress, and would gradually attain a condition where foreign aggression would be impossible.