I always held the standpoint that any such tentative steps for peace, even when a ministerial source could not be proved _a priori_, should be treated with prudence, but in a friendly spirit. In the above-mentioned case, however, the fact was that Italy neither could separate from her Allies, nor did she wish to do so. Had that been her purpose, it would have involved her in a conflict with England, whose aim in war was the conquest of Germany and not any Italian aspirations. A separate peace with Italy--her separation from her Allies--was entirely out of the question, but a general peace would have been possible if the Western Powers could have come to an understanding with Germany. The only object gained by that appeal would have been to confirm the extent of our exhaustion from the war. Had I answered that I was ready to give up this or that province, it would have been interpreted as a conclusive symptom of our increasing weakness, and would not have brought peace any nearer, but rather kept it at a greater distance. I answered, therefore, in friendly tone that the Monarchy did not aim at conquests, and that I was ready to negotiate on the basis of pre-war conditions of possession. No answer was sent. After the downfall I was told by a person, certainly not competent to judge, that my tactics had been mistaken, as Italy would have separated from her Allies and concluded a separate peace. Further accounts given in this chapter prove the injustice of the reproof. But it is easy now to confirm the impression that there was not a single moment while the war lasted when Italy ever thought of leaving her Allies. An extraordinary incident occurred at the end of February, 1917. A person came to me on February 26 who was in a position to give credentials showing him to be a recognised representative of a neutral Power, and informed me on behalf of his Government that he had been instructed to let me know that our enemies--or at least one of them--were ready to conclude peace with us, and that the conditions would be favourable for us. In particular, there was to be no question of separating Hungary or Bohemia from the Empire. I was asked, if agreeable to the proposition, to communicate my conditions through the same agency, my attention being called, however, to the proviso that _these proposals made by the enemy Government would become null and void from the moment that another Government friendly to us or to the hostile country heard of the step_. The bearer of this message knew nothing beyond its contents. The final sentence made it obvious that one of the enemy Powers was anxious to negotiate unknown to the others.