I did not for a moment doubt that it was a question of Russia, and my authority confirmed my conviction by stating distinctly that he could not say so positively. I answered at once by telegram on February 27 through the agency of the intervening neutral Power that Austria-Hungary was, of course, ready to put an end to further bloodshed, and did not look for any gains from the peace, because, as stated several times, we were engaged in a war of defence only. But I drew attention to the rather obscure sense of the application, not being able to understand whether the State applying to us wished for peace _with us only_, or with the entire _group of Powers_, and I was constrained to emphasise the fact that we did not intend to separate from our Allies. I was ready, however, to offer my services as mediator if, as presumed, the State making the advance was ready to conclude peace with our entire group of Powers. I would guarantee secrecy, as I, first of all, considered it superfluous to notify our Allies. The moment for that would only be when the situation was made clear. This was followed on March 9 by a reply accepting, though not giving a direct answer to the point of whether the proposal was for a peace with us alone or together with our Allies. In order to have it made clear as quickly as possible, and not to lose further time, I answered at once requesting the hostile Power to send a confidential person to a neutral country, whither I also would send a delegate, adding that I hoped that the meeting would have a favourable result. I never received any answer to this second telegram. A week later, on March 16, the Tsar abdicated. Obviously, it was a last attempt on his part to save the situation which, had it occurred a few weeks earlier, would not only have altered the fate of Russia, but that of the whole world. The Russian Revolution placed us in an entirely new situation. After all, there was no doubt that the East presented an obvious possibility of concluding peace, and all our efforts were turned in that direction, for we were anxious to seize the first available moment to make peace with the Russian Revolutionary Party, a peace which the Tsar, faced by his coming downfall, had not been able to achieve. If the spring of 1917 was noted for the beginning of the unrestricted U-boat warfare and all the hopes centred on its success and the altered situation anticipated on the part of the Germans, the summer of the same year proved that the proceeding did not fulfil all expectations, though causing great anxiety to England. At that time there were great fears in England as to whether, and how, the U-boat could be paralysed. No one in London knew whether the new means to counteract it would suffice before they had been tried, and it was only in the course of the summer that the success of the anti-submarine weapons and the convoy principle was confirmed.