Independent Bohemia: An Account of the Czecho-Slovak Struggle for LibertyNosek, Vladimir
History
Independent Bohemia: An Account of the Czecho-Slovak Struggle for Liberty
Nosek, Vladimir
Czechoslovakia -- History; World War, 1914-1918 -- Czech Republic -- Bohemia
The Magyars realised from the beginning the importance of an understanding
between themselves and Prussia, and they directed their foreign policy
accordingly. The setting up of dualism in 1867, which finally established
the German-Magyar hegemony in Austria-Hungary in the interests of Prussia,
was the work of two Magyars--Julius Andrassy and Francis Deak, who took
advantage of Austria's defeat at Sadova to further their interests. In
1870, when Vienna contemplated revenge against Prussia, the Magyars again
intervened in favour of Prussia. When questioned as to Hungary's attitude,
Andrassy, then Premier, declared in the Hungarian Parliament that under no
circumstances would he allow any action against Prussia, and exerted all
his influence in Vienna to that effect. It was also due mainly to Magyar
influence that all attempts of the Czechs to weaken German influence in
Austria were frustrated. Francis Joseph always promised to be crowned King
of Bohemia when he wished to placate the Czechs in times of stress for
Austria: in 1861, 1865, 1870 and 1871. But he never carried out his
promises. In this he was guided not only by considerations of dynastic
interest, but also by the advice of the Magyars.
But the most decisive and fateful exercise of Magyar influence upon
Austria's foreign policy occurred in 1879, when the Austro-German Alliance
was finally concluded. This was equally the work of Bismarck, who spared
the defeated Austria in order to make an ally of her, and of a
Magyar--Count Andrassy--who from 1871 to 1879 was the Austro-Hungarian
Foreign Minister. It was this Magyar help which made Bismarck utter words
of gratitude and declare in 1883:
"Our political judgment leads us to the conviction that German and
Magyar interests are inseparable."
It is true that there always was a Magyar opposition against Austria
(though never against Prussia). But this opposition was used as a weapon to
extort concessions from Austria. At the bottom of their hearts, however,
the Austrian Germans were always at one with the Magyars in their common
desire to oppress the Slavs. And the responsibility of Count Tisza for the
present world catastrophe is just as great as that of the Kaiser himself.
3. The Czechs saw clearly the progress of events. Bismarck was well aware
of the importance of Bohemia, for he declared that the master of Bohemia
would become the master of Europe. He did not desire to annex any Austrian
territory, since he knew that sooner or later Germany would swallow the
whole of Austria, as she has done in this war. Indeed, at the Congress of
Berlin in 1878, Bismarck did not conceal his intention of using
Austria-Hungary in Germany's interests. At the bottom of his heart he was
at one with the radical Pan-German writers, like Lagarde, Treitschke,
Mommsen, Naumann and others, who openly declared that the Slavs should be
subjugated and the Czechs, as the most courageous and therefore the most
dangerous of them, crushed.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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