Spinoza, 46, 166. Stadium, Zeno's argument of, 134 n., 175 ff. Subject-predicate, 45. Synthesis, 157, 185. Tannery, Paul, 169 n. Teleology, 223. Testimony, 67, 72, 82, 87, 96, 212. Thales, 3. Thing-in-itself, 75, 84. Things, 89 ff., 104 ff., 213. Time, 103, 116 ff., 130, 155 ff., 166, 215. absolute or relative, 146. local, 103. private, 121. Uniformities, 217. Unity, organic, 9. Universal and particular, 39 n. Volition, 223 ff. Whitehead, vi, 207. Wittgenstein, vii, 208 n. Worlds, actual and ideal, 111. possible, 186. private, 88. Zeller, 173. Zeno, 129, 134, 136, 165 ff. [1] Delivered as Lowell Lectures in Boston, in March and April 1914. [2] London and New York, 1912 (�Home University Library�). [3] The first volume was published at Cambridge in 1910, the second in 1912, and the third in 1913. [4] Appearance and Reality, pp. 32�33. [5] Creative Evolution, English translation, p. 41. [6] Cf. Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, pp. 85 ff. [7] Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 1. [8] Logic, book iii., chapter iii., � 2. [9] Book iii., chapter xxi., � 3. [10] Or rather a propositional function. [11] The subject of causality and induction will be discussed again in Lecture VIII. [12] See the translation by H. S. Macran, Hegel's Doctrine of Formal Logic, Oxford, 1912. Hegel's argument in this portion of his �Logic� depends throughout upon confusing the �is� of predication, as in �Socrates is mortal,� with the �is� of identity, as in �Socrates is the philosopher who drank the hemlock.� Owing to this confusion, he thinks that �Socrates� and �mortal� must be identical. Seeing that they are different, he does not infer, as others would, that there is a mistake somewhere, but that they exhibit �identity in difference.� Again, Socrates is particular, �mortal� is universal. Therefore, he says, since Socrates is mortal, it follows that the particular is the universal�taking the �is� to be throughout expressive of identity. But to say �the particular is the universal� is self-contradictory. Again Hegel does not suspect a mistake but proceeds to synthesise particular and universal in the individual, or concrete universal. This is an example of how, for want of care at the start, vast and imposing systems of philosophy are built upon stupid and trivial confusions, which, but for the almost incredible fact that they are unintentional, one would be tempted to characterise as puns. [13] Cf. Couturat, La Logique de Leibniz, pp. 361, 386. [14] It was often recognised that there was some difference between them, but it was not recognised that the difference is fundamental, and of very great importance. [15] Encyclop�dia of the Philosophical Sciences, vol. i. p. 97. [16] This perhaps requires modification in order to include such facts as beliefs and wishes, since such facts apparently contain propositions as components. Such facts, though not strictly atomic, must be supposed included if the statement in the text is to be true.