Still, the Indians were not believed to be veteran tacticians, although everybody underestimated their qualities. They were extremely liable to panic. A sudden attack or a surprise almost always disorganized them and threw them into confusion. Under the peculiar circumstances, I think there is little question that Custer’s tactics were entirely sound and well considered, although this conclusion is often disputed. Where Custer made a mistake appears to be in his failure to take greater precautions that the attacks should be delivered simultaneously. He had a much longer distance to go than Reno and over a much worse country before he could attack, and he was not at all sure as to where Benteen was or when he could join. Nevertheless, the chances of success were many, the chances of failure few, and I have no doubt that Custer would have been successful had there not been a woeful lack of conduct on the part of his principal subordinate. ----- Footnote 67: It was General Terry’s urgent representations which were the main-springs of Sheridan’s action.—C. T. B. Footnote 68: At the time this was written, it was not generally understood that the full Indian appellation of this stream was Little Big Horn.—C. T. B. Footnote 69: It was delayed in transmission, owing to the cutting of the telegraph wires by the Indians. Footnote 70: Italics mine.—C. T. B. Footnote 71: Journal of the Military Service Institution in the United States, Vol. XVIII., No. LXXIX.: “The Campaign Against the Sioux in 1876,” by Major-General Robert P. Hughes, U. S. A. Footnote 72: In Terry’s report to the Secretary of War, under date of November 21, 1876, he gives his own understanding of his orders, which is fully warranted, in the following paragraph: “At a conference which took place on the 21st between Colonel Gibbon, Lieutenant-Colonel Custer, and myself, I communicated to them the plan of operations which I had decided to adopt. It was that Colonel Gibbon’s column should cross the Yellowstone near the mouth of the Little Big Horn, and thence up that stream, with the expectation that it would arrive at that point by the 26th; that Lieutenant-Colonel Custer with the whole of the Seventh Cavalry should proceed up the Rosebud until he should ascertain the direction in which the trail discovered by Major Reno led; that if it led to the Little Big Horn it should not be followed, but that Lieutenant-Colonel Custer should keep still further to the south before turning toward that river, in order to intercept the Indians should they attempt to pass around to his left, and in order, by a longer march, to give time for Colonel Gibbon’s column to come up.” Footnote 73: