Indian Fights and Fighters: The Soldier and the SiouxBrady, Cyrus Townsend
History
Indian Fights and Fighters: The Soldier and the Sioux
Brady, Cyrus Townsend
Dakota Indians -- Wars; Indians of North America -- Wars -- 1866-1895
[Illustration: Map to illustrate the route of the three battalions at
the Little Big Horn]
Reno’s advance down the creek took him near to the east bank of river.
Custer had followed him, slightly on his right flank. When Reno
discovered the head of the village in the valley, he crossed the creek
to Custer and reported what he had seen. Custer directed him to cross
the river, move down the valley, and attack in force, informing him that
he would be “supported” by Custer’s battalion. Reno accordingly put his
battalion to a fast trot in columns of four, crossed the Little Big Horn
River beyond the mouth of the creek, and proceeded onward for perhaps
half a mile. Then he threw his troops in line, reaching from the river
to the bluffs on the left, with the Arikara scouts on the left flank,
and galloped down the valley for a mile farther.[77]
Reno stated subsequently that he believed that Custer intended to keep
behind him all the time; and he fully expected, should he come in
contact with Indians, that Custer would be on hand to join in the
attack. Custer, however, had not continued down the creek or crossed the
river with Reno, but had swung off to the high bluffs on the right bank
of the creek, east of the river. Reno mistook the purport of Custer’s
statement. In order to support an attack, it is not necessary to get
behind it. A flank attack or a demonstration in force, from some other
direction, frequently may be the best method of supporting an attack.
Custer’s plan was entirely simple. Reno was to attack the end of the
village. Benteen was to sweep around and fall on the left of it, Custer
on the right. The tactics in the main were those which had been used so
successfully in the Battle of the Washita (q.v.), and were much in vogue
among our Indian fighters during the Indian wars.
Dividing forces in the face of an enemy to make several simultaneous
attacks is dangerous, because it is almost impossible to secure a proper
coöperation between the attacking units. A skilful general will
concentrate his force upon the separately approaching and more or less
isolated units and beat them in detail. Washington’s tactics at
Germantown were similar to those of Custer; and his force, which would
have swept the British from the field if his plans had been carried out,
was beaten in detail for lack of coördination in the separate attacks.
Some of Napoleon’s most brilliant battles were fought when he occupied
interior lines and by successive attacks broke up converging columns.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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