(iii) Battles are won mainly by the accurate fire of individuals at decisive range. Long range fire should rarely be opened without special directions from a superior; in the absence of orders, however, it may be directed against large bodies, such as half a battalion in close order. (iv) In crises, and against large and conspicuous targets, fire should be as rapid as is compatible with accuracy, in order that as great loss may be inflicted as possible. In ordinary circumstances fire should be slow. (v) The moral and material effect of concentrated fire, when every rifle is directed against one portion of the enemy’s line, is far greater than when each man fires at a mark of his own selection. (vi) Oblique fire (that is fire delivered at an angle to the hostile line) will give better results than frontal, because the surface exposed by the enemy will be greater. (vii) Enfilade fire (that is, fire directed along the enemy’s line) will be more effective than frontal, because errors in estimation of range should be of less importance, and its moral effect is greater. (viii) The surest way of checking the enemy’s advance, or bringing about his retirement, is to shoot down his leaders. (ix) Great results may be obtained from fire delivered unexpectedly at short range, and men should always be on the watch for opportunities of this nature. (x) Well concealed, a few bold men, extended at wide intervals, can, by rapid fire, deceive the enemy as to the strength of the force by which he is opposed, may delay him for a considerable time, and before withdrawing inflict serious loss. =54.= _Reporting and passing Orders._ Skirmishers should be taught to report to their leaders anything they may observe of the dispositions of their enemy, to call their attention to all signals and to the movements of other units, and to pass orders, messages or information along the line in a clear and intelligible manner, without shouting. =55.= _Intervals._ The intervals between skirmishers depend on the nature of the ground, and on the character of the operation, and on the volume of fire it is sought to bring to bear on the enemy. They may vary considerably; but it should be clearly recognised that over-extension results in loss of control, and in diminishing the volume of fire. In close country and woods, and whenever counter-attack is probable, over-extension is very dangerous. It is essential, therefore, before extending, that the length of front to be occupied should be carefully considered; and the commander of a party of skirmishers must always be able to give a reason for the interval at which his men are extended. =56.= _Reinforcing._