Professor Powell's objection against Miracles is, in fact, practically that of the infidel Hume; who asserted "that no testimony for any kind of Miracle can ever possibly amount to a probability, much less to a proof." He argued that Miracles, being contrary to general experience, are incapable of proof. He maintained also, (with Spinoza,) that Miracles, being contrary to the established laws of Nature, imply, in the very character of them, a palpable contradiction. This latter position seems to be identical with that adopted by Professor Powell. In a certain place, this author finds fault with "the too frequent assumption ... of the part of the ... _Advocate_, when the character to be sustained should be rather that of the unbiassed _Judge_." (p. 95.) But what are we to think of the judicial fairness of one who is not only Advocate and Judge in his own cause; but who even turns the Witnesses out of Court; and will listen to no evidence,--on the plea that it _cannot_ be trustworthy; or at least, that it _shall_ be unavailing?--"I express myself with caution," (says Bp. Butler, with reference to arguments against the credibility of Revelation,) "lest I should be mistaken to vilify Reason; which is indeed the only faculty we have wherewith to judge concerning anything, even Revelation itself: or be misunderstood to assert that a supposed revelation cannot be proved false, from internal characters. For it may contain clear immoralities, or contradictions; and either of these would prove it false. Nor will I take upon me to affirm, that nothing else can possibly render any supposed revelation incredible. Yet still the observation is, I think, true beyond doubt; that _objections against Christianity, as distinguished from objections against its evidence, are frivolous[65]_."