International Congress of Arts and Science, Volume 1: Philosophy and Metaphysics
Philosophy
International Congress of Arts and Science, Volume 1: Philosophy and Metaphysics
Conference proceedings; Medicine -- Congresses; Science and the humanities -- Congresses; Technology -- Congresses
Yet the true situation is not characterized by such an antithesis. If we
say that all knowledge is ultimately practical, we are speaking from an
epistemological point of view, inasmuch as we take it then as a
reconstruction of the world through the purposive activity of the
over-individual subject. On the other hand it is an empirical point of
view from which ultimately all knowledge, that of the physician and
engineer and lawyer, as well as that of the astronomer, appears
theoretical. But this antithesis can, therefore, not decide the further
empirical question, whether or not in the midst of theoretical knowledge
two kinds of sciences may be discriminated, of which the one refers to
empirical practical purposes and the other not. Such an inquiry would
have nothing to do with the epistemological problem of pragmatism; it
would be strictly non-philosophical, just as the separation of chemistry
into organic and inorganic chemistry. This empirical question is indeed
to be answered in the affirmative. If we ask what causes bring about a
certain effect, for the sake of a practical purpose of ours,--for
instance, the curing a patient of disease,--no one can state facts which
are not in principle to be included in the complete system of physical
causes and effects and thus in the system of physical sciences. And yet
it may well be that the physical sciences, as such, have not the
slightest reason to mention the effect of that special drug on that
special pathological alteration of the tissues of the organism. The
descriptions and explanations of science are not a mere heaping up of
material, but a steady selection in the interest of the special aim of
the science. No physical science describes every special pebble on the
beach; no historical science deals with the chance happenings in the
daily life of any member of the crowd. And we already well know the
point of view from which the selection is to be performed. We want to
know in the physical and psychical sciences whatever is involved in the
object of our experience, and in the historical and normative sciences
whatever is involved in the demands which reach our will. But whether we
have to do with the objects or with the demands, in both cases we have
systems before us which are determined only by the objects or demands
themselves, without any relation to our individual will and our own
practical activity. Theoretically, of course, our will, our activity,
our organism, our personality is included in the complete system; and if
we knew absolutely everything of the empirical effects of the object or
of the consequences of these demands, we should find among them their
relation to our individual interests; but that relation would be but one
chance case among innumerable others, and the sciences would not have
the slightest interest in giving any attention to that particular case.
Thus if our knowledge of chemical substances were complete, we should
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