These are the formal suggestions which I should like to make with reference to the problem in hand; they are only intended to indicate how one might proceed, and are not to be regarded as either exhaustive or infallible. There arises now the second question as to how such work is to be organised. As the same concepts occur in several related sciences, and must receive the same designations, it would not be practicable to entrust the construction of the vocabularies to special commissions for each particular science. It would be more advisable to appoint a certain number of persons to collect the material and to make out lists of the concepts for which terms are required, and then to appoint commissions representing a whole group of sciences to discuss the necessary principles, after which the details could be worked out and finally subjected to the examination and approval of the whole body. To make matters at once more definite, I think the exact sciences ought to be first taken into consideration, for in their case the fixation of concepts is most highly developed. There is no need for a replacement of the well-known Latin nomenclature employed in the descriptive sciences, nor would any attempt in this direction have any likelihood of success. We must look rather to the distant future, when all other sciences will have already adapted themselves to the international idiom for the translation of the Latin names into the forms of the international language (retaining the stems, however) in order to produce for æsthetic reasons a uniform system throughout the whole of science. On the other hand, I consider it absolutely necessary to subject the concepts of _logic_ and the _theory of cognition_ to the same process of scientific delimitation and fixation. In the first place, these sciences belong, at least theoretically, to the exact sciences; and, in the second place, work in these departments of knowledge is rendered extraordinarily difficult by the fact that their concepts are expressed in the terms used in daily life, whose elastic nature constantly frustrates exact work.