Interpretations of Poetry and ReligionSantayana, George
Religion
Interpretations of Poetry and Religion
Santayana, George
Aesthetics; Literature -- History and criticism; Poetry; Religion
But the passions are naturally blind, and the poverty of the
imagination, when left alone, is absolute. The passions may ferment as
they will, they never can breed an idea out of their own energy. This
idea must be furnished by the senses, by outward experience, else the
hunger of the soul will gnaw its own emptiness for ever. Where the
seed of sensation has once fallen, however, the growth, variations,
and exuberance of fancy may be unlimited. Only we still observe (as in
the child, in dreams, and in the poetry of ignorant or mystical poets)
that the intensity of inwardly generated visions does not involve
any real increase in their scope or dignity. The inexperienced mind
remains a thin mind, no matter how much its vapours may be heated and
blown about by natural passion. It was a capital error in Fichte and
Schopenhauer to assign essential fertility to the will in the creation
of ideas. They mistook, as human nature will do, even when at times
it professes pessimism, an ideal for a reality: and because they saw
how much the will clings to its objects, how it selects and magnifies
them, they imagined that it could breed them out of itself. A man who
thinks clearly will see that such self-determination of a will is
inconceivable, since what has no external relation and no diversity
of structure cannot of itself acquire diversity of functions. Such
inconceivability, of course, need not seem a great objection to a man
of impassioned inspiration; he may even claim a certain consistency in
positing, on the strength of his preference, the inconceivable to be a
truth.
The alleged fertility of the will is, however, disproved by
experience, from which metaphysics must in the end draw its analogies
and plausibility. The passions discover, they do not create, their
occasions; a fact which is patent when we observe how they seize
upon what objects they find, and how reversible, contingent, and
transferable the emotions are in respect to their objects. A doll
will be loved instead of a child, a child instead of a lover, God
instead of everything. The differentiation of the passions, as far as
consciousness is concerned, depends on the variety of the objects of
experience,--that is, on the differentiation of the senses and of the
environment which stimulates them.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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