Introduction to Mathematical PhilosophyRussell, Bertrand
Philosophy
Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy
Russell, Bertrand
Mathematics -- Philosophy
The use of mathematical induction in demonstrations was,
in the past, something of a mystery. There seemed no reasonable
doubt that it was a valid method of proof, but no one quite
knew why it was valid. Some believed it to be really a case
of induction, in the sense in which that word is used in logic.
Poincaré[9]
considered it to be a principle of the utmost importance,
by means of which an infinite number of syllogisms could be
condensed into one argument. We now know that all such views
are mistaken, and that mathematical induction is a definition,
not a principle. There are some numbers to which it can be
applied, and there are others (as we shall see in Chapter VIII.)
to which it cannot be applied. We define the "natural numbers"
as those to which proofs by mathematical induction can be
applied, i.e. as those that possess all inductive properties. It
follows that such proofs can be applied to the natural numbers,
not in virtue of any mysterious intuition or axiom or principle,
but as a purely verbal proposition. If "quadrupeds" are
defined as animals having four legs, it will follow that animals
that have four legs are quadrupeds; and the case of numbers
that obey mathematical induction is exactly similar.
[9]Science and Method, chap. IV.
We shall use the phrase "inductive numbers" to mean the
same set as we have hitherto spoken of as the "natural numbers."
The phrase "inductive numbers" is preferable as affording a
reminder that the definition of this set of numbers is obtained
from mathematical induction.
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