Hershberger is here defining pacifism broadly to include the European meaning of opposition to war, but not necessarily a refusal to take part in it. In the United States, and generally in Great Britain, the term is ordinarily applied only to those who actually refuse participation in war. [9] See Devere Allen, _The Fight for Peace_ (New York: Macmillan, 1930), 531-540. [10] On the origins of these terms see Haridas T. Muzumdar, _The United Nations of the World_ (New York: Universal, 1942), 201-203. [11] John Haynes Holmes, using the older term rather than "pacifist," has said, "The true non-resistant is militant--but he lifts his militancy from the plane of physical, to the plane of moral and spiritual force." _New Wars for Old_ (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1916), xiii. [12] Cecil John Cadoux, _Christian Pacifism Re-examined_ (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1940), 15-16; Leyton Richards, _Realistic Pacifism_ (Chicago: Willett, Clark, 1935), 3. [13] Shridharani, _War Without Violence_, 292. [14] John Lewis says, "We must draw a sharp distinction between the use of violence to achieve an unjust end and its use as police action in defence of the rule of law." _Case Against Pacifism_, 85. [15] Clarence Marsh Case, _Non-Violent Coercion_ (New York: Century, 1923), 323. Italics mine. [16] C. J. Cadoux has clearly stated his position in these words: "He [the pacifist] will confine himself to those methods of pressure which are either wholly non-coercive or are coercive in a strictly non-injurious way, foregoing altogether such injurious methods of coercion as torture, mutilation, or homicide: that is to say, he will refrain from war." _Christian Pacifism_, 65-66. [17] Maurice L. Rowntree, _Mankind Set Free_ (London: Cape, 1939), 80-81. II. VIOLENCE WITHOUT HATE Occasions may arise in which a man who genuinely abhors violence confronts an almost insoluble dilemma. On the one hand he may be faced with the imminent triumph of some almost insufferable evil; on the other, he may feel that the only available means of opposing that evil is violence, which is in itself evil.[19] In such a situation, the choice made by any individual depends upon his own subjective scale of values. The pacifist is convinced that for him to commit violence upon another is itself the greatest possible evil. The non-pacifist says that some other evils may be greater, and that the use of this lesser evil to oppose them is entirely justified. John Lewis bases his entire _Case Against Pacifism_ upon this latter assumption, and says that in such a conflict of values, pacifists "continue to be pacifists either because there is no serious threat, or because they do not expect to lose anything, or perhaps even because they do not value what is threatened."[20] The latter charge is entirely unjustified. The pacifist maintains his opposition to violence in the face of such a threat, not because he does not value what is threatened, but because he values something else more.