In the thirty-fifth chapter of _Numbers_ we read of the cities of refuge. They were to be six in number—three upon each side of the Jordan; and were intended to afford shelter to those who had unintentionally shed innocent blood. “And they shall be for you cities for refuge from the avenger; that the manslayer die not until he stand before the _assembly_ (עדה) for _judgment_” (_Numbers_, xxxv. 12).(3) It is then laid down that if the murder have been deliberate, it shall be punished with death (16-21). But if the fatal blow have been struck _without enmity_ or _premeditation_, or _by chance_ (22, 23), “then the _assembly_ (עדה) shall _judge_ between the slayer and the revenger of blood.... And the _assembly_ (עדה) shall deliver the slayer out of the hand of the revenger of blood, and the _assembly_ (עדה) shall restore him to the city of his refuge” (24, 25). It is quite impossible to suppose that the judicial tribunal here spoken of could be the entire body of the people, or even the 600,000 male adults. The question to be tried was one of the highest moment, involving the life or death of a fellow-citizen. It was also one of extreme delicacy, having to deal, not with the mere external act, but with the motives and feelings of the heart. To the _assembly_ (עדה) it belonged to pronounce, not merely whether one man had killed another, but whether in his heart he had _committed the crime_ of murder. For this purpose witnesses should be examined, evidence should be carefully sifted, and, perhaps, even the domestic secrets of the accused and of his victim should be laid bare. Was this a task that could be entrusted to a mixed multitude of 600,000 men? Accordingly we find that Rosenmuller, in his commentary on this passage (_Num._, xxxv. 24), explains the word, _the assembly of judges_—“cætus judicum urbis in cujus agro contigerit homicidium”. If we apply this interpretation to the passage in _Leviticus_, every shadow of improbability and inconsistency will at once disappear from the narrative. Now, we ask Dr. Colenso, when a word in Scriptural usage has two different meanings, which must we choose when we come to examine a text in which that word is found? Are we to select the meaning which is in every way suitable to the context and circumstances; or must we rather adopt an interpretation which will make the sense absurd and impossible? Dr. Colenso has preferred the latter course. It appears to us that the former is alone consistent with the instinct of common sense and the principles of genuine criticism.