however, be induced by very different kinds of processes, namely, by all processes which possess in common the condition that they suddenly increase certain disintegration processes in the living nerve substance. Indeed, the further analysis of the whole process shows in addition that the nerve impulse as such likewise does not form a condition for the contraction of the muscle, but it first of all produces the necessary condition for the muscle contraction by suddenly greatly increasing certain chemical processes, which take place in the living substance of the resting muscle. The nerve impulse can, therefore, also be replaced by other processes, if only these contain the condition for an increase of disintegration of the muscle substance, as in the case of the direct stimulation of the curarized muscle, where the influence of nervous impulses is totally eliminated. In a further analysis of this process we should penetrate even more deeply into the differentiation of the individual constituent processes and the isolating of the special conditions on which each link in the chain is dependent. Such an analysis then shows us the following: Every thing, every state or process, is a complex of numerous components, of which _one_ always conditions the other in the manner that the individual conditioning components are themselves in their turn contained as constituents of other complexes and are conditioned here again by other factors. These factors in themselves as such are not directly necessary to the taking place or existing of the special component and can, therefore, be replaced by others. Closer observation shows that there is a constant interdependence between all things in the world. _Every_ thing in the world is _indirectly_ dependent upon _every other_, although often so remotely that we are not able to trace the connection. Absolute things, completely isolated and independent of others, _do not_ exist in the world. In observing and studying complexes individually, we must not forget that we only _think_ of them as isolated from the great eternal coherence, from which they are in reality not separated. The conception of condition, however, only then has meaning, if we refer to it in connection with the direct dependence of one factor upon another. Nevertheless if we understand by conditions those which are connected by multitudinous intermediate components, then we would render the conception of conditions useless. For if every thing in the world were the condition for every other, the conception of relation would lose its value in special states or processes. Should the conception of condition have a meaning in regard to a _certain_ state or process, then we should only look upon _that_ part of a complex upon which the other is _directly_ dependent as a condition. When, however, we meet with a factor for a process or state, which can apparently be replaced by another factor, we have not carried the analysis far enough. Upon