“The policy and practice of the Russian Government has always been to push forward its encroachments as fast and as far as the apathy or want of firmness of other Governments would allow it to go, but always to stop and retire when it was met with decided resistance, and then to wait for the next favourable opportunity to make another spring on its intended victim. In furtherance of this policy, the Russian Government has always had two strings to its bow—moderate language and disinterested professions at Petersburg and at London; active aggression by its agents on the scene of operations. If the aggressions succeed locally, the St. Petersburg Government adopts them as a _fait accompli_ which it did not intend, but cannot, in honour, recede from. If the local agents fail, they are disavowed and recalled, and the language previously held is appealed to as a proof that the agents have overstepped their instructions. This was exemplified, in the treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, and in the exploits of Simonivitch and Vikovitch in Persia.”[69] And Lord Palmerston wrote as follows to Lord Aberdeen (July 4, 1853), when the combined fleets of England and France were at Besika Bay:—“In the meantime, however, I hope you will allow the squadrons to be ordered to go up to the Bosphorus as soon as it is known at Constantinople that the Russians have entered the Principalities, and to be further at liberty to go into the Black Sea, if necessary or useful for the protection of Turkish territory. The advantages of such a course seem to be— “First. That it would encourage and assist the Turks in those defensive arrangements and organizations which the present crisis may give the Turkish Government facilities for making, and the benefit of which, in strengthening Turkey against attack, will continue after the crisis is over. “Secondly. It would essentially tend to prevent any further inroad on Turkish territory in Europe or in Asia, and it is manifest that any such further inroad would much increase the difficulties of a settlement. “Thirdly. It would act as a wholesome check upon the Emperor and his advisers, and would stimulate Austria and Prussia to increased exertions to bring the Russian Government to reason. “Fourthly. It would relieve England and France from the disagreeable, and not very creditable, position of waiting without venturing to enter the back door as friends, while the Russians have taken forcible possession of the front hall as enemies. “If these orders are to be given, I would suggest that it is very important that they should be given without delay, so that we may be able, when these matters are discussed this week in Parliament, to say that such orders have been sent off. Of course they would at the same time be communicated to the Russian Government.” But the Premier did not agree with Palmerston’s views.