The combined fleets, at the request of the Sultan, passed up to Constantinople (October 7, 1853). Palmerston then made two propositions to the Cabinet:— “First. That instructions should be sent to Constantinople that, in the event of war having been declared, the two squadrons should enter the Black Sea, and should send word to the Russian admiral at Sebastopol that, in the existing state of things, any Russian ship of war found cruising in the Black Sea would be detained, and be given over to the Turkish Government. “Secondly. That England and France should propose to the Sultan to conclude a convention to the effect that, whereas war has unfortunately broken out between Russia and Turkey, in consequence of differences created by unjust demands made upon Turkey by Russia, and by unwarrantable invasion of the Turkish territory by a Russian army; and whereas it is deemed by England and France to be an object of general European interest, and of special importance to them that the political independence and the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire should be maintained inviolate against Russian aggression, the two Powers engage to furnish to the Sultan such naval assistance as may be necessary in existing circumstances for the defence of his empire; and they moreover engage to permit any of their respective subjects who may be willing to do so, to enter the military or naval service of the Sultan. In return, the Sultan is to engage that he will consult with England and France as to the terms and conditions of the new treaty which is to determine, on the conclusion of hostilities, the future relations of Russia and Turkey.” But Lord Aberdeen in reply said:— “I cannot say that I think the present state of the Russo-Turkish question would authorize such a proceeding on our part as that which you intend to propose.” On November 1, 1853, Palmerston again said in concluding another letter to Lord Aberdeen:— “It seems to me, then, that our course is plain, simple, and straight. That we must help Turkey out of her difficulties by negotiation, if possible; and that if negotiation fails, we must, by force of arms, carry her safely through her dangers.” After the destruction of the Turkish fleet at Sinope, Palmerston wrote to Aberdeen as follows:— “Will you allow me this opportunity of repeating in writing what I have more than once said verbally, on the state of things between Russia and Turkey? It appears to me that we have two objects in view: the one to put an end to the present war between these two Powers; the other to prevent, as far as diplomatic arrangements can do so, a recurrence of similar differences, and renewed dangers to the peace of Europe.