Japan and the Pacific, and a Japanese View of the Eastern QuestionInagaki, Manjiro
History
Japan and the Pacific, and a Japanese View of the Eastern Question
Inagaki, Manjiro
Eastern question (Balkan); Europe -- History -- 1871-1918; Japan -- Politics and government
“I confess I am not prepared to adopt the mode which you think most
likely to restore peace.”
Lord Palmerston tendered his resignation on receiving this reply, but
withdrew it ten days after when the Cabinet adopted his views.
On June 16, 1854, Lord Palmerston wrote to the Duke of Newcastle, then
Minister of War—“Our only chance of bringing Russia to terms is by
_offensive_ and not by defensive operations. We and the French ought to
go to the Crimea and take Sebastopol. If this blow were accompanied by
successful operations in Georgia and Circassia, we might have a Merry
Christmas and a Happy New Year.”
Thus we see that the English policy during the Crimean crisis changed
from peace tactics to defensive operations, and was subsequently turned
into an offensive line of action which terminated in a brilliant triumph
for England.
But how was Lord Palmerston able to carry out his war policy so
vigorously? The answer is a very simple one. He was backed and urged on
by the nation at large, who were incensed at the insolence of Russia.
Thus he was able to pursue his plans, being encouraged and supported by
a people who were well able to carry out what they resolved upon.
Kinglake said he (Lord Palmerston) “was gifted with the instinct which
enables a man to read the heart of a nation.”
His judgment was rightly pronounced, for Palmerston saw the feelings of
his national constituents and steered his course well and skilfully.[70]
What, then, was the national feeling of England at that time?
“In the present instance,” said the Prince Consort, “their (the English)
feeling is something of this sort: The Emperor of Russia is a tyrant,
the enemy of all liberty on the Continent, and the oppressor of Poland.”
From these royal remarks, I do not think I shall be far wrong in saying
that the growing tendency of the English people towards liberalism since
the Reform Bill of 1832, and the teaching of William Wilberforce, had
led them to consider Russia not only as a national enemy but as a
general opponent of the rights of humanity and civilization. No wonder
that a war became a necessity after this public manifestation.
At the end of the last chapter I stated that England had rapidly
increased, in wealth and prosperity since the Repeal of the Corn Laws.
Gladstone, in the House of Commons, stated that such was the vigour and
elasticity of the English trade, that even after the disadvantage of a
bad harvest, and under the pressure of war, the imports from day to day,
and almost from hour to hour, were increasing, and that the very last
papers laid on the table showed within the last three months of the year
that there was an increase of £250,000 in the national exports.[71]
This, then, was one of the reasons which enabled England to carry on
this war so successfully.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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