“We (English) have undertaken to sustain Egypt until she is competent to sustain herself against every enemy, foreign or domestic. We cannot see that that time has yet arrived. It may arrive quicker or later. Other Powers may help us by concurring in measures which will improve the position and increase the prosperity of Egypt, or they may defer that day by taking an opposite course. But whether the day comes sooner or later, our policy remains unaltered, and we will pursue our task to the end.” We can easily get at the pith of Lord Salisbury’s speech. If France again became a co-partner of England in establishing peace and order in Egypt, then England would be quite willing to restore the dual control with regard to Egypt, and Lord Salisbury in 1878 had declared that England did not desire to annex Egypt. The dual control of France and England with regard to Egypt might possibly settle affairs there temporarily, or neutralize that country on the same lines as Belgium; but still this is not a sufficient guarantee against an Anglo-French dispute on the Egyptian question. The French Government of the present day is not noted for stability, always changing, never agreeing, and ready for foreign quarrels, and although now they are supporting the English Government in Egypt, it is not safe to depend upon them, for the feeling of rivalry is sure to arise, and great caution has to be exercised in order to prevent complications arising. No matter what happens, England must have free communication with India, and as long as there is only one road, ruptures will be inevitable, and there can be no firm alliance as in the case of the Crimean War. It seems to me to be a favourable time to suggest to Turkey the construction of a railway from Constantinople or some other port on the Mediterranean to Bussorah on the Persian Gulf: why should not England undertake the construction herself? This route would certainly possess four great advantages: (1) It would be a shorter route to India. (2) It would be a valuable means of quick transportation of either Turkish or English troops for the defence of Asia Minor. (3) It would avoid a clashing of English and French interests in Egypt to a certain extent, and a dual control would thereby be strengthened, and would produce two more results, viz:— (_a_) A firmer alliance between England and France. (_b_) England would be able to reduce her troops in Egypt, and devote them to the defence of Asia Minor, and by this means be more able to withstand Russian attacks in that quarter and in Persia. (4) Lastly, Turkey would be strengthened financially owing to the prosperity of her commerce, and productions in Asia Minor, which is the usual effect of such a communication.