Japan and the Pacific, and a Japanese View of the Eastern QuestionInagaki, Manjiro
History
Japan and the Pacific, and a Japanese View of the Eastern Question
Inagaki, Manjiro
Eastern question (Balkan); Europe -- History -- 1871-1918; Japan -- Politics and government
By this means England can fulfil her public duty to Turkey, which she
had undertaken to do by the Anglo-Turkish Convention, and can maintain
her national honour pledged when Lord Beaconsfield and Count Andrassy
discussed the defence of Turkey from Russian invasion in Asia and
Europe.
It is difficult to see why this railway scheme was not brought forward
at the Anglo-Turkish Convention, because it appears to me to be of
primary importance for the defence of both Asia Minor and India; and
also how it escaped the mind of so clever a statesman as Lord
Beaconsfield.
It has, however, been informally discussed both at political meetings
and by pamphlet only recently: the financial difficulties seemed quite
surmountable, but political opinions are decidedly at variance on the
subject. But it is my opinion that England would be perfectly right in
compelling Turkey to carry out this scheme, and if she was not able to
execute it, then England could perform it herself, and she would be only
fulfilling one of the duties which she has undertaken to perform with
the Sultan at the Anglo-Turkish Convention.
The following articles strangely enough appeared in one of the English
daily papers[92]:—
“The tradition, adhered to even by Lord Beaconsfield, of remaining
allied with Turkey at all hazards, is no longer advocated even by
Conservative occupants of the Foreign Office. Since the occupation by
England of Cyprus, and still more of Egypt, Constantinople has lost much
of its importance to England. The Russian fleet in the Black Sea would,
in the event of war, pass through the Dardanelles, with or without the
Sultan’s consent, and advance into the Mediterranean. The rule of the
Sultan at Constantinople, therefore, no longer affords a guarantee
against a Russian attack of the English possessions in the
Mediterranean. Russia already possesses a road to India _viâ_ Merv, and
the possession of Constantinople could afford her no resistance in this
direction.”
“England, on the other hand, in the event of Russia’s impeding the
conveyance of English troops through the Suez Canal, has at her disposal
another way to India, one which leads exclusively through British
dominions—the new Canadian railway. One no longer thinks of defending
India at Constantinople, but in Afghanistan and on the Anglo-Afghan
frontier. England has as much interest as the other Powers in preventing
Russia from advancing towards Constantinople, but this is no longer held
to be a vital interest that would have to be protected even by force of
arms.”
This is certainly a serious mistake in policy if backed up by the
English Government, even more so than that of the Duke of Wellington,
1827–1830.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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