triumphantly pointed out that the real issue contained in the resolution was the question whether the imperial word was proper or not. He proceeded to say that the Constitution was the manifestation of a part of the full imperial sovereignty, the exercise of which should therefore not be obstructed by the Constitution, and that the imperial word had issued from the emperor through his special sovereign rights, and was proper and legal. No exposure of the opponents' logic could be more ruthless, nor a bolder enunciation of the emperor's "special sovereign rights" could be imagined, than the trenchant argument of Hoshi. It would seem that in this debate both parties conceded that the imperial act was transconstitutional. Seen in this light, the statement made in this connection by Premier Itō to the president of the upper house is highly significant. Although the recent imperial word, said he, should not be regarded as an imperial rescript, as it bore no countersignatures of the ministers of state, it had been issued after a personal conference between the emperor and the premier. The latter was, Marquis Itō went on to declare, responsible for the act of the emperor, for, constitutionally, the premier is held responsible for all the political conduct of the sovereign. Coming from the very framer and commentator of the Constitution, these words may be construed as establishing an important precedent. The emperor is happily relieved of the responsibility for his political conduct, but may he, under extraordinary necessity, resort to a transconstitutional measure at will, or, in other words, may the premier request the emperor to employ such a measure by the simple assumption by the former of the responsibility therefor? The marquis appears to answer the question in the affirmative. The future political development of this point will be a matter of great interest. The fundamental conception of the Constitution being such as we have described, it would appear as if the political life of Japan must in a large measure depend upon the personal views and inclinations of the emperor, to say nothing of those of his ministers. Such a conception, however, ignores two considerations of utmost importance, namely, that under the new régime are being created regular channels through which the life of the state will more and more habitually run, and that the tradition, whose force has accumulated through the long history of Japan since her foundation as a state, is the spirit of conciliation on the part of the subject and the habit of assuming political impersonality on the part of the supreme ruler. Individual idiosyncrasies of the sovereign will probably prove to be the least important factor of the future political life of the Japanese nation.