The evolution of things, Dewey says, is a real fact, and is to be reckoned with. Moreover, if everything that exists changes, then the evolution of life and mind surely have a bearing on the nature of physico-chemical things. They must have in them the trait of direction of change towards life and mind. "To say, accordingly, that the existence of vital, intellectual, and social organization makes impossible a purely mechanistic metaphysics is to say something which the situation calls for."[278] In other words, the world, metaphysically considered, must have evolution, as well as the physico-chemical traits. "Without a doctrine of evolution we might be able to say, not that matter _caused_ life, but that matter under certain conditions of highly complicated and intensified interaction is living. With the doctrine of evolution, we can add to this statement that the interactions and changes of matter are themselves of a kind to bring about that complex and intensified interaction which is life."[279] Dewey holds that evolution rests upon the reality of time: "time itself, or genuine change in a specific direction, is itself one of the ultimate traits of the world irrespective of date."[280] This article presents on the whole a distinct advance over the position taken in the earlier essay, "Some Implications of Anti-Intellectualism," which was reviewed in the last chapter. Dewey is not now, to be sure, instituting a wholesale inquiry into the nature of being, but he betrays an interest in the general, as opposed to the specific traits of reality. He inquires into the real nature of the world, and believes that he discovers its ultimate traits. This essay, of course, is incomplete, and consequently indefinite in certain important respects. It may be said, nevertheless, to give an accurate view of the metaphysical back-ground against which all of Dewey's theories are projected. His metaphysics, as would be expected, are evolutionary throughout, and evolution is conceived, where he is at all definite, in biological terms. FOOTNOTES: [249] _Influence of Darwin on Philosophy_, Introduction, p. iv. [250] Vol. VIII: "I. Naive Realism _vs._ Presentative Realism," pp. 393-400. "II. Epistemological Realism: The Alleged Ubiquity of the Knowledge Relation," pp. 546-554. [251] _Op. cit._, p. 395. [252] _Ibid._, p. 397. [253] In this connection Dewey's disagreements with Professor McGilvary are of especial interest. See especially McGilvary's article, "Pure Experience and Reality" (_Philosophical Review_, Vol. XVI, 1907, pp. 266-284) and Dewey's reply, together with McGilvary's rejoinder (_Ibid._, pp. 419-424). McGilvary failed to understand that Dewey's argument was conducted on a purely 'naturalistic' basis, an almost inevitable error, in view of Dewey's practical identification of psychology, biology, and logic. [254] _Ibid._, p. 399.