But this, although, as we may well think, a sound conclusion, was not a necessary one; and it was long denied by able statesmen, judges, and lawyers. An elaborate and powerful dissenting opinion by Chief Justice Gibson, of Pennsylvania, containing the most searching argument on the subject with which I am acquainted, given in 1825,[22] reaches the result that under no constitution where the power to set aside legislative enactments is not expressly given, does it exist. But it is recognized that in the Federal Constitution the power is given, as regards legislation of the States inconsistent with the Federal Constitution and laws. It is not always noticed that in making our Federal Constitution, there was an avoidance of any explicit declaration of such a power as touching federal legislation, while it was carefully provided for as regards the States. In the Federal Convention, there was great anxiety to control the States, in certain particulars; and various plans were put forward, such as that Congress should have a negative on state laws, and that governors of the States should be appointed by the federal authority, with power to negative state acts. But all these, at last, were rejected, and the matter took the shape of a provision that the Constitution and the constitutional laws and treaties of the United States should be the supreme law of _the respective States_; and the judges of _the several States_ should be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding. Later, the Committee on Style changed the phrase “law of the respective States” to “law of the land.” But the language, as to binding the judges, was still limited to the judges of the several States. Observe, then, the scope of this provision: it was to secure the authority of the federal system within the States.