Of two other cases belonging in the same class of Marshall’s opinions, viz., Gibbons _v._ Ogden, in 1824, and Brown _v._ Maryland, in 1827, it is enough here to say that they deal with one of the most difficult and perplexed topics of constitutional law, namely, the coördination of the functions of the national and state governments, in regard to the power granted to Congress to regulate foreign and interstate commerce, a subject of great importance and difficulty, on which the decisions of the Supreme Court are now and long have been involved in much confusion and uncertainty. Gibbons _v._ Ogden brought into question the constitutionality of a law of New York granting to Fulton, the inventor, the sole right of navigating the waters of New York by steam. The grant had been sustained by Chancellor Kent and by the New York Court of Appeals; but these decisions were now overruled in a famous and powerful opinion. In two other cases on this subject, also of great importance, Marshall gave leading opinions. It may fairly be thought that his treatment of the general question involved in these cases, instructive as it was, was yet less fruitful and less far-seeing than in most of his other great cases. He was now in a region pretty closely connected with the second class of cases, above named; a set of cases, where even so great a man as Marshall erred sometimes, from interpreting too literally and too narrowly the restraints upon the States. It was natural, in giving full scope to the authority of the general government, that he should be inclined to apply, with their fullest force and operation, these clauses of restraint and prohibition. His great service to the country and his own generation was that of planting the national government on the broadest and strongest foundations. That, as he rightly conceived, was the one chief necessity of his time. In doing this, when it came to considering the reach that must also be allowed to the States, and just how the coördination of the two systems should be worked out, probably no one man, no one court, no human wisdom was adequate, then, to mapping it all out. Time alone, and a long succession of men, after some ages of experience, might suffice for that. The wisdom of those who made the Constitution, as it has lately been said, was mainly shown “in the shortness and generality of its provisions, in its silence, and its abstinence from petty limitations.” But, as time went on, definitions and specifications had to be made and applied; silence, abstinence, generality, were no longer adequate. And in the class of cases, now referred to, great and far-reaching as were the results of Marshall’s labor, and unqualifiedly as they are often praised, one may perceive, as I venture to think, a less comprehensive and statesmanlike grasp of the problems and their essential conditions than are found in some other parts of his work.