It assumes as an essential feature of a written constitution what does not exist in any one of the written constitutions of Europe. It does not remark the grave distinction between the power of disregarding the act of a coördinate department, and the action of a federal court in dealing thus with the legislation of the local States; a distinction important in itself, and observed under the written constitutions of Europe, which, as I have said, allow this power in the last sort of case, while denying it in the other. Had Marshall dealt with this subject after the fashion of his greatest opinions he must also have considered and passed upon certain serious suggestions arising out of the arrangements of our own constitutions and the exigencies of the different departments. All the departments, and not merely the judges, are sworn to support the Constitution. All are bound to decide for themselves, in the first instance, what this instrument requires of them. None can have help from the courts unless, in course of time, some litigated case should arise; and of some questions it is true that they never can arise in the way of litigation. What was Andrew Johnson to do when the Reconstruction Acts of 1867 had been passed over his veto by the constitutional majority, while his veto had gone on the express ground, still held by him, that they were unconstitutional? He had sworn to support the Constitution. Should he execute an enactment which was contrary to the Constitution, and so void? Or should he say, as he did say to the court, through his Attorney-General, that “from the moment [these laws] were passed over his veto, there was but one duty, in his estimation, resting upon him, and that was faithfully to carry out and execute these laws”?[36] And why is he to say this? Again, what is the House of Representatives to do when a treaty, duly made and ratified by the constitutional authority, namely, the President and Senate, comes before it for an appropriation of money to carry it out? Has the House, under these circumstances, anything to do with the question of constitutionality? If it thinks the treaty unconstitutional, and so void, can it vote to carry it out? If it can, how is this justified?